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Abstract: 
Scenario planning, as a recognised organisational intervention, has steadily grown in popularity since the mid- 
20th century. To date, there are arguably as many methods and techniques as there are practitioners, with 
applications across nearly all sectors of public and private industry. Many feel that scenario planning is forever 
consigned to the realm of chaos, incapable of being clearly defined. We disagree and see the field as a collective 
of experiences and knowledge that play upon a theme, where emerging realities slowly reveal a structure to the 
system. In response, we propose a comprehensive typology for scenario planning interventions – the 
Comprehensive Scenario Intervention typology – which incorporates all dimensions of existing typologies along 
with additional dimensions and functions that reflect previously unrecognized and emergent topics relevant to 
understanding the critical realities of an intervention. The Comprehensive Scenario Intervention typology 
expands the scope of scenario planning interventions and adds to the theoretical foundation of the field.  
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1. Introduction  
Scenario planning (SP), as a recognised organisational intervention, has been in practice in the west since the 
post-war period, largely due to the pioneering efforts of Herman Kahn at the RAND Corporation (1948-1961), 
and later Pierre Wack at Royal Dutch Shell (1971–1982). The methods continue to develop along pragmatic 
lines, with an almost ‘trial by fire’ effort. With SP appreciating the better part of a century in use, we should 
take this time to assess what has emerged – from both academic inquiry and field applications – and determine 
where we can go from here. The field is rich with typologies, schools, theoretical development, and an almost 
anatomical map of scenario characteristics. However, as true today as in decades past, are the numerous and 
ever-emerging methods and schools of SP. These differences are as responsible for expanding the field of SP as 
they are for introducing obstacles to that same field. Some feel that SP is forever consigned to the realm of 
chaos, incapable of being clearly defined in any manner. We disagree with this view, and see the field of SP as a 
collective of experiences and knowledge that play upon a theme, where realities have been revealed in absence 
of pre-defined boundaries. To answer this problem, we offer a tool that is both clear in definition and flexible in 
application, therefore introducing a guidance system for the broadest range of SP interventions. The 
“Comprehensive Scenario Intervention” (CSI) typology complements the collective efforts of the field and 
brings greater robustness and validity to the practice, while allowing for expanded applications beyond scenario 
science into the broader field of futures studies.  
Huss and Honton (1987) identify three major schools of SP: Intuitive Logics (IL: Ogilvy and Mandel, 1984), 
Cross-Impact Analysis (CIA: Gordon, 1994a), and Trend-Impact Analysis (TIA: Gordon, 1994b). Sometimes 
the IL approach is referred to as the ‘Shell approach’ due to its early popularity with Pierre Wack when 
employed at Royal Dutch Shell (Wack, 1985a; Wack, 1985b) or the ‘SRI school’ due to the pioneering days at 
the Stanford Research Institute (International, 2019). Bradfield, et al. (2005) add to this list the French School of 
La Prospective, developed by Gaston Berger, and expanded by Godet (1987), and combine CIA and TIA under 
the single umbrella of Probabilistic Modified Trends. Bradfield, et al., along with Amer, et al. (2013) offer 
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comprehensive reviews of the four SP schools, and describe the three main scenario approaches as plausibility 
based (IL), preference based (La Prospective) and probability based (Probabilistic Modified Trends). Chermack 
(2011) identifies 10 schools of SP, though several are modifications of the main three.  
The schools of SP give way to the collection of potential scenario dimensions. Any typology of SP must have a 
working definition of what a “scenario” could or should be. Much like the pursuit of a unifying theory, there is a 
plethora of definitions (for reviews see Amer et al., 2013; Börjeson, Höjer et al., 2006; Bradfield, Wright et al., 
2005; Chermack, 2018; Mackay and McKiernan, 2018; Stewart, 2008). Recently, however, Spaniol and 
Rowland (2018a) take the field to task, and develop an operant, working definition of what scenarios are, based 
on the overarching elements of existing definitions from within futures and foresight sciences. From their 
analyses, the main (possibly necessary) components of scenarios are that they “have a temporal property rooted 
in the future and reference external forces in that context; scenarios should be possible and plausible while 
taking the proper form of a story or narrative description; and that scenarios exist in sets that are systematically 
prepared to coexist as meaningful alternatives to one another” (p. 1). As Dator (2009, p. 6) puts simply, scenario 
practitioners study “images of the future”.  
Another major issue in the SP literature is the multi-faceted approach to theoretical and methodological 
development. A regular argument encountered is that SP suffers from a dismal theoretical grounding (see 
Bradfield R. M., 2008; Chermack, 2002; Martelli, 2001; Spaniol and Rowland, 2018b). However, we believe 
this perspective deserves a reinterpretation, where the field has produced a richness in theory (and method), 
where many discuss potential components that could contribute to a foundational theory. Inayatullah (2008) 
offers a strong approach for framing perspectives. By integrating a variety of futures and foresight studies and 
building on their concepts, Inayatullah identifies six foundational concepts, six questions to address, and six 
pillars of futures studies. Futures thinking is conceptually divided into the used future (using someone else's 
desires), the disowned future (ignoring other paths), alternative futures (range of futures), alignment (holistic 
connections), models of social change (levels of control), and use of the future (functionality). The six questions 
to ask to aid in creating the conceptual future space are: 1) What is your prediction? 2) Which future are you 
afraid of? 3) What are your future's hidden assumptions? 4) What are the alternatives to your future? 5) What is 
your preferred future? 6) How might you get there? Inayatullah's six pillars of futures studies are mapping (past, 
present and future), anticipation (forward-casting), timing the future (metaphors), deepening the future (details), 
creating alternatives (broaden), transforming the future (preferences). Amer et al. (2013) develop insightful 
questions, focusing heavily on the methods, that offer practical application to any scenario work. Bishop et al. 
(2007) help standardise the system of language in the practice in their catalog of scenario techniques. Millet 
(2003) lists three major challenges to the efficacy and utility of SP as a method of intervention: resolve scenario 
definitions and methods, clarify and expand scenario applications, and make the practice less resource heavy. 
The CSI typology aims to address Millet's second challenge – clarify and expand scenario applications – and by 
extension bring clarity and affordability to his other challenges. Balarezo and Nielson (2017) present a better 
fitting methodological outline for exploring the SP intervention framework by dividing the intervention across 
antecedents, processes, outcomes and variables. This sets the perspective of SP as an intervention apart from SP 
techniques. Chermack (2011) manages to take these fragments of the field and integrate them into arguably the 
most comprehensive theoretical foundation for SP, to date. Chermack's Scenario Planning Theory is comprised 
of six domains: dialogue, learning, mental models, decision making, leadership, and organisation 
performance/change theories. His reasoning is that more than any other domains, these six have the highest 
repetitious mention and use within the SP literature. Chermack's proposed theory is still quite recent, and 
understandably requires a fair bit of empirical work for support. To this end, we hope to show how the CSI 
typology and the integrated conceptual theories of the field mutually support one another, thus strengthening our 
collective attempts to define a robust and valid foundation for the field of SP.  
The aims of a SP intervention are to challenge practitioners’ (i.e. the individuals participating in the scenario 
planning process) perspectives of the organisational environment, by increasing flexibility in thinking, to 
ultimately ensure the survival and success of the organisation (Schoemaker, 1993; van der Heijden et al., 2002). 
SP helps achieve this by intervening in the strategic management process (Hodgkinson and Healey, 2008). The 
key to such a strategic intervention lies in guiding teams to “design scenarios so that managers would question 
their own model of reality and change it when necessary” (Wack, 1985a, p. 84). The driving force behind 
desiring to challenge and change these models of reality (i.e. mental models) is due to the strong and often 
cristalised presence of cognitive biases that stem from regularly referenced heuristics for decision-making. 
Biases create boundaries to our perceptions of reality, and limit the scope of our rationality, awareness, and 
creativity (Simon, 1972). It is from these limitations that insufficient awareness is given to the environmental 
uncertainties. This bears consideration only because we hold the general assumption that environmental 
uncertainties will change as the future emerges (Balarezo and Nielsen, 2017). By remaining inattentive to such 
environmental factors, organisations can suffer from insufficient planning and inflexibility, therefore failing to 
successfully navigate their emerging future.  
At this point in the field's development, given the variety of schools, definitions, and the attempts to unify these 
areas within an inherently pragmatic methodology that allows for continuous modifications, it seems appropriate 
to establish a typology of the potential dimensions for a SP intervention. We disagree with Spaniol and 
Rowland's (2018b) claim that any possible attempt at future typologies (and theories) to help establish a 
foundation to the field of SP are little more than contributions to the “chaos” that many proport to plague the 
discipline. Rather than paradoxically distancing the literature from a potential foundational theory by developing 
a new typology, the efforts in this paper can be seen as the next logical step in the scientific validation of a 
field's development. First, each former typology either attempted to address a specific set of dimensions within 
the scenario process, or encompass perceived missing shared perspectives from extant typologies. Such efforts 
should not be seen as divided and mudding the waters, but rather multiple, corroborated contributions where 
each add yet another piece (or several) to the SP puzzle. A puzzle that is being constructed from the most salient 
pieces towards the more obscure, as they are discovered, rather than by traditional methods which establish the 
boundaries (e.g. edge pieces) first. Therefore, leaving us not so much unclear on the functional parts, but unclear 
on the final form. Second, many typologies (e.g. van Notten, Rotmans, van Asselt, and Rothman, 2003; VRVR 
typology) have combined existing typologies and expanded them. These are precisely the efforts any developing 
discipline requires in order to benefit from the many discoveries. Expanding does not necessarily create distance 
from the foundation, but rather embodies the very expression of scientific exploration and unification. 
Typologies help formalise the existing and potential factors of a discipline. By establishing a system of 
classification that can be intuitively and logically followed, a typology can aid efforts in the field. Third, the 
purpose of the CSI typology is specifically to guide bestpractice intervention efforts. No single SP method is 
going to fit every intervention. Understanding which method is the best fit for a given internvention will depend 
on the particular dimensions of the organisation's SP profile. A “profile” is the unique set of CSI typological 
dimensions that plot the details of the chosen SP intervention. For example, if a facilitator is developing an 
intervention, and they desire to have both decision makers and stakeholders as part of the SP practitioner group, 
then they can reasonaly expect to be working with a heterogeneous group (and therefore not a homogeneous 
group), and will probably be using at the very least, a participatory method of data generation. If the 
organisation is motivated to hold a SP intervention in order to discover tranformative options to their policies, 
then the group has a clearer picture of the organisation's willingness to implement tranformational impacts, 
whether in structured or unstructured ways. The CSI typology aids the practitioners in identifying such 
dimensions of their profile. This is a major leap forward from the typical ad hoc method of discover-as-you-go.  
A typology can help strengthen the field's foundation, “create useful heuristics, and provide a systematic basis 
for comparison” (Smith, 2002, p. 381). The earliest generalised SP typology was published in 1980 by Ducot 
and Lubbens. Each successive typology developed with a different focus, using a different language, with 
occasional overlapping dimensions. We agree with Millet's (2003, p. 19) statement that, “the next generation of 
scenario tools should not only combine previous methods, but also actually blend them into a more 
comprehensive methodology,” and apply this to our efforts with extant scenario typologies, the body of theory, 
and real-world applications. The aims of this paper are to 1) present a comprehensive typology for SP 
interventions that offers practitioners clear profiles for guidance towards fundamental changes in perceptions 
and organisational actions, 2) aid scholars in empirically exploring the necessary dimensions of SP 
interventions, and 3) join in the effort of building a stronger foundation for the field of SP – and by extension, 
futures and forecasting methods at large.  
2. Limitations  
The typological approach has well-known flaws. What sets typologies apart from taxonomies is that the 
dimensions of the former often represent conceptual rather than empirical knowledge (Smith, 2002). The 
drawbacks are that a typology's dimensions may be neither exhaustive nor mutually exclusive, use ad hoc 
criteria, lack explanatory and predictive qualities, and suffer the problem of reification (Bailey, 1994).  
2.1. Dimensions  
Unlike taxonomies, typologies do not necessarily elicit a particular order, depending on the purposes of use. The 
order can determine the ways in which the information is relayed and utilised. This is particularly true in the 
hard sciences, with the use of taxonomies, but in the social sciences a different method of use is possible (Riede, 
2006; Smith, 2002). As opposed to biological classifications, cultural materials can emerge through a form of 
organic evolution, and as such, be divided on any number of factors.2 The four, broad CSI typology dimensions 
(i.e. sections) can have an ordering effect, which support both planning and process efforts, but can also 
abandon any temporal necessity when used as an aid for research development or retroactively as a systems 
check. The more nuanced dimensions (i.e. within sections), however, do not necessarily have an ordered path, 
and are there to show the importance of different critical dimensions. Therefore, the CSI typology can be used 
as a guide for ordered efforts or as a guide for necessary dimensions, depending on the facilitator's needs.  
With these adaptable criteria established for the applicability of the CSI typology, so too does this same 
adaptability extend to the individual dimensions. Depending on the dimensions, the relationships between them 
can be dependent, independent, interrelated, or mutually exclusive. Rather than treating this as a drawback, the 
adaptability of dimensional relationships strengthens the design by creating a road map of available and 
unavailable options, based on the dimensions chosen to develop your SP profile. 
Some of the dimensions of previous typologies do not fit into the  
discrete dimensions of the CSI typology. Instead they describe a selection of dimensions that comprise a 
particular SP profile. This is the case with Wilkinson and Eidinow's (2008) typology (WE typology), which 
draws on existing environmental scenario projects to develop three themes: problem-focused, actor-centric, and 
reflexive interventionist or multiagent based (RIMA). The three themes capture a series of CSI dimensions to 
create three wholly different profiles, with the purpose of capturing the epistemologies that underpin SP. 
Therefore, the three profiles of the WE typology are discussed at length in the last section of the paper, where 
the CSI typology is applied, in full.  
Chermack (2018, p. 50) acknowledges that “it is generally difficult to engage in intervention research when the 
intervention (scenario planning) is usually customized, methods are varied as well as the timespans and contexts 
of different scenario projects.” However, as Chermack points out, many comparably complex disciplines have 
advanced in similar fashion, and charges that the discipline of SP needs researchers to tackle its difficult design 
in order to increase credibility and advance the discipline. To this end, we acknowledge that the CSI typology 
may commit similar efforts as previous typologies, by inadvertently creating broad dimensions, as time and 
further evolution of the field may prove. As with any system, the evolving process inherent in SP will 
necessitate regular reviews of any existing typology. Further nuances and new dimensions (i.e. puzzle pieces) 
have the potential to emerge over time. As a pragmatic model, it would only be appropriate that regular reviews 
of existing typologies are made. This is the motivation behind the “Comprehensive” title, rather than 
“Complete”. A comprehensive typology presents the fullest picture, to date, for assessing a SP intervention, 
adds beneficial knowledge to the field that will prove largely resilient with time, and serves as a catalyst for 
future discoveries of potentially new dimensions. Further, if we have done our job successfully, then the CSI 
typology will have the capacity to serve as a foundational typology from which further dimensions can branch.  
2.2. Criteria  
When working with conceptual rather than empirical data, the methods for building a typology can follow more 
intuitive than explicit lines of reasoning. In response, this issue is addressed through a multilevel, developmental 
approach, which we believe brings the greatest level of validity and robustness to the construction of SP 
typologies. Beginning with a bottom-up approach, the CSI typology was first outlined using the dimensions of 
all pertinent SP typologies. Commonalities were grouped, and differences were separated. All existing 
dimensions were incorporated. Next, using Spaniol and Rowland's (2018a) approach, the extant body of 
research was layered to discover overlapping SP elements either suggested or utilised in interventions. This 
created a skeletal framework for the CSI typology. After this, outlier elements (those practices that did not have 
wide use) were measured against the developed CSI typology skeletal framework, to determine whether they 
were dimensions or techniques (Bishop et al., 2007). At this point, we used Smith's (2002) typological approach, 
which borrows from the traditional taxonomical method, and reviewed empirical work to increase the validity 
and robustness of the CSI typology. Empirical data were not an available resource for many of the earlier 
typologies, therefore giving the CSI typology additional novel support. Moving into the future, as the body of 
empirical work expands, these data should serve as stronger sources for typological development.  
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2.3. Explanatory and predictive qualities  
Godet and Roubelat (1996, p. 1) highlight the fact that organisations must “not only be reactive and preactive, 
but also proactive.” In agreement with the authors, the CSI typology serves to facilitate all three efforts. There is 
the utilitarian use of presenting a map of dimensions inherent in an intervention. From a retrospective function, 
the CSI typology can help experienced facilitators plot the profiles of previous SP interventions to learn from 
and improve methods. As Wack pointed out when retiring from Shell, one of the most difficult things to change 
are the mental maps (i.e. models) of managers (Chermack, 2011). Mintzberg (1994) echoes these sentiments, 
stating that this is possibly even more difficult than building the scenarios, themselves. If a former SP 
intervention yielded little change for the organisation, for example, the CSI typology could help reveal hidden 
friction points, stickiness, or lost resources, by providing a map against which methods used in the intervention 
could be plotted. By forcing users to explicitly declare the dimensions of their SP profile, they are quickly faced 
with the primary inconsistencies. Going further, causal indicators can be identified by logically linking the path 
of outcomes from the dimensions of the unique profile. Using the example above, failures could be caused due 
to whether the decision makers were part of the scenario group (increasing the probability that their mental 
models were challenged), whether the quantity of scenarios was too few (perhaps from low involvement and too 
little information) or too many (resulting in information overload, leading to strategic inertia), or perhaps the 
institutional resources were limited, thus leading to poor use of open institutional conditions. Any number of 
explanatory elements can be learned from a retrospective look. From a prospective, predictive function, a 
typology can help facilitators anticipate the parameters of a particular profile, and act “as a checklist when 
analysing scenarios” (van Notten et al., 2003, p. 439). A typology can also aid researchers in studying the 
different schools of SP, given their research goals, questions, and methodology.  
2.4. Reification  
The final point is the problem of reification. Typologies that suffer such failures are traditionally found in more 
conceptually-based practices, such as policy, religious, and moral development. These practices are problematic 
to the typological method because there exists little consensus and/or poor definitions. SP interventions, 
however, do not suffer such extreme vagaries in knowledge and practice. The consensus of the literature, results 
of empirical work, and developments of realworld applications lend themselves to clear definitions (e.g. 
quantitative and qualitative data) and divisible, conceptual dimensions (e.g. planning, development, outcomes).  
Furthermore, the CSI typology does not attempt to classify such contentious abstractions as personality, which 
are outside the scope of this typology (see Hodgkinson and Healey, 2008). This is mainly due to the diminishing 
support of such personality theories as the Five Factor Model and Myers-Briggs Type Indicator, and similar, 
which have shown to be less reliable, valid, independent, and comprehensive than previously thought (Gardner 
and Martinko, 1996; McCrae and Costa Jr, 1989; Paul, 2004). But this is not to say the unique qualities of each 
practitioner are not vital to the success of an interventions. Cognitive factors, as they pertain to a SP 
intervention, are discussed at length within various dimensions across the CSI typology, both individually and 
jointly.  
2.5. Communicative power  
van Notten et al. (2003) argue that a potential limitation to their typology is that the tension between striving for 
detail and attempting to achieve comprehensiveness may lead to the deterioration of their typology's 
communicative power. This recognition of static between the two functions may explain the more simplistic and 
elegant approaches to the other typologies. Given the extensive practice of SP, and the lack of robust evidence 
on their true effects (whether as a business-support method or mental models challenger), we believe the field 
could benefit from a typology that errs on the side of comprehensiveness, even if it means losing some of the 
elegance. 
Another drawback to typologies is that they may be limited in  
scope. As van Notten et al. (2003) offer, classifications for businessoriented scenarios would be hard pressed to 
also acknowledge the differences that are fundamental in, say, macro-economic and environmental scenarios. 
To address this issue, the CSI typology has been compared against the prevailing schools of scenario planning, 
Chermack's theoretical design, as well as over 200 scenario case studies that cover a heterogenous selection of 
disciplines and purposes (management, economics, environment, policy sciences, space exploration, etc.) to 
ensure its broad applicability. One sector we were unable to more fully explore for applicability was the private 
sector, and this was largely due to protections in place on sensitive materials.  
3. Method  
To discover all possible scenario planning typologies, the broadest search criteria were used. The following 
sources were searched: EBSCO, ProQuest, Emerald, JSTOR, JURN, Google Scholar, Research Gate, University 
of Strathclyde Library, Web of Knowledge, and Scopus.3 Dates were restricted to the 20th and 21st centuries, up 
to March 2019. The publication formats of book, journal, dissertation, thesis, conference proceeding, and 
periodical were included. The search terms “scenario typology”, “scenario planning typology”, “scenario 
method typology”, “scenario intervention typology”, “scenario school typology”, along with substituting 
“taxonomy” for “typology” in all previous phrases, were used, and all attempts were made to search all 
languages, not just English. The search criteria returned 4450 publication results. Fifty-one publications 
specifically included a SP typology. We eliminated publications that referenced other typologies – instead of 
developing their own –, typologies for specific fields (e.g. education or transport), and typologies for a specific 
stage within the larger SP process. Eight typologies emerged from this search that were developed for more 
ubiquitous SP applications. A larger number of scenario reviews and case studies also serve to inform the 
parameters of the CSI typology.  
The eight typologies offer brief elaborations, presented as either a simple matrix (Ducot and Lubben, 1980; 
Heugens and van Oosterhout, 2001; Wilkinson et al., 2013) or as three semi-reducible themes (Börjeson et al., 
2006; Pulver and VanDeveer, 2007; van de Riet et al., 2008; van Notten et al., 2003; Wilkinson and Eidinow, 
2008). These eight typologies will be referred by the following titles in this paper: BHDEF typology (Börjeson 
et al., 2006), DL typology (Ducot and Lubben, 1980), HV typology (Heugens and van Oosterhout, 2001), PV 
typology (Pulver and VanDeveer, 2007), VAV typology (van Der Fels‐Klerx et al., 2002), VRVR typology 
(van Notten et al., 2003), WE typology (Wilkinson and Eidinow, 2008), and WKM typology (Wilkinson et al., 
2013). Though the WE typology was developed using mainly environmental scenarios and the VAV typology 
was developed for the specific realm of policy within transport infrastructure investments, the authors state that 
their typologies are aimed at scenario practitioners, in general, and make a compelling argument for the broader 
applications of their dimensions, and as such we find both typologies offer invaluable information.  
The CSI typology incorporates all previous typologies, pertinent to this classification, along with additions that 
reflect previously unrecognized dimensions and emergent topics. All past typologies offer insightful and novel 
perspectives on SP interventions. However, a common practice in the present typologies is to create overly-
broad categories. This is an understandable method to initiate in a developing system. In order to capture as 
much of the field as possible, but preserve intuitive levels of comprehensibility, broad categorisation can be 
necessary. This effort has the consequence, of course, of grouping several dimensions together that may later 
prove to be too disparate. These points are addressed in the explanations of each dimension.  
The first major obstacle in developing the CSI typology was understanding each author's use and purpose 
behind their dimensions. Sometimes it is the case that the same dimension is used across different typologies, 
with different meanings. Other times different dimensions are used across the typologies, but with similar or 
identical meanings. An example is the dimension “normative/normativity”. The DL typology defines normative 
as the explicit accounting of the observer's preoccupations and interests, or “value-mindedness” (p. 53) from 
practitioners. The HV typology defines normativity as levels of involvement (passive or active) reflected in an 
organisation's interests and expectations in scenarios. The VRVR typology uses the term normativity to describe 
scenarios that include probable or preferred outcomes. And finally, the BHDEF typology uses the term 
normativity to describe how a specific target is reached within a scenario, presenting either a preserving path 
through efficiency, or transformative adjustments. As it worked out, the VRVR and DL typological uses of 
normativity were comparable and combined to help define the “Normative scenarios” dimension, whereas the 
HV typological use provided two sub-categories of normative dimension, and the BHDEF was unique enough 
to inform a new dimension that reduces into divisible categories.  
The second obstacle was determining whether an existing typology's dimension was narrow enough to serve as 
a single CSI typological dimension, or broad enough to be re-purposed. The dissection of dimensions resulted in 
one of two inclusions in the CSI typology; Either the original dimension is maintained within the new typology, 
or the original dimension is used to describe a profile. We were motivated to preserve the existing vernacular 
wherever possible, to improve the synthesis of the various bodies of research. However, the terminology for 
some of the dimensions in past typologies did not go far enough in capturing the meaning of the CSI typological 
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dimension, to which it was applied. In these few cases, we therefore provided new terminology in an effort to 
better define the dimension.  
The CSI typology begins by modeling the structure of the VRVR typology. This method was chosen for two 
reasons. First, the VRVR typology is the most extensively developed of the existing typologies. van Notten et 
al. (2003, p. 424) recognised that existing typologies did not “sufficiently capture the diversity in contemporary 
scenario analysis”, and instead developed their own extensive VRVR typology that breaks from the more 
simplistic designs of the others. Second, van Notten, et al. tested the robustness of their VRVR typology against 
18 scenario projects selected from 70 case studies – spanning the disciplines of management, economics, 
environmental, and policy sciences – showing the broad applicability of a multi-themed typology.  
The CSI typology is divided into a temporal heirarchy of dimensions. The broadest dimensions are “sections”. 
Sections are thematic divisions of SP that encompass the preparation, scope, content, and follow-through of the 
process. Each section is divided into different “characteristics”. Each characteristic is further divided into 
different “categories”. Some categories are divided into different “sub-categories”, which are the most focused 
dimensions of the CSI typlogy. Depending on the dimensions, the relationships between them can be dependent, 
independent, interrelated, mutually exclusive, or unrelated. Table 1 presents the full CSI typology – divided into 
four broad sections, with a total of 22 characteristics, 91 categories, and 30 sub-categories. A full SP profile 
should include all sections, but does not require all characteristics, categories, or sub-categories to be 
represented. The specifics of an organisation, a facilitator's chosen SP method, and available resources will all 
determine which dimensions are available and necessary. The CSI typology was tested against the scenario case 
studies used in the extant typologies, the leading schools of SP, and an additional 36 SP interventions across a 
variety of disciplines (see Appendix A).  
[insert Table 1 about here] 
Ducot and Lubben (1980) suggest that by aligning scenarios with the cross-selection of dimensions, the 
resulting scenarios will be more resilient to methodological criticisms, and by extension, more credible. These 
cross-selections create unique SP profiles. Whereas the WKM typology offers 4 potential profiles, and the DL 
typology offers 27 potential profiles, the CSI typology has the ability to map out more than one million unique 
profiles.  
4. CSI typology  
When no definitive model can be specified for predictive purposes, but key factors can be identified, which can 
develop into structurally different futures, then we are working with structural (Dreborg, 2002), or qualitative 
(Eriksson, 2004), uncertainty. As such, this type of uncertainty is best served by SP methods which help 
practitioners navigate such structural changes, where flexibility, adaptation, and exploitation can be developed 
(Biggs et al., 2007; Eriksson, 2004). The future is a conceptual space, and scenarios can act as transitional 
objects to take us from our perceptions of the here-and-now to our assumptions about the there-and-then 
(Wilkinson, 2009). The CSI typology was developed to help facilitators and practitioners identify and work with 
these uncertainties.  
4.1. Section 1: Project goals  
The first section is concerned with answering the question, “What do you want to do?” This section presents the 
elements that must be addressed to set the agenda for a SP intervention. Summarising the general perspectives 
from schools of planning theory, Dreborg (2002, p. 4) states that “in practice, planning is more reactive than 
goal-orientated in character,” and this is due to cognitive limitations from bounded rationality. To help counter 
such limitations, practitioners should take the necessary time to understand and articulate their organisation's 
goals on the various dimensions within Section 1. There can be scenarios that aim for a single, unifying goal, as 
was the case with the branching scenario workshops for the local governance of the North West Tasmania 
region, where the workshops aimed for “[articulated] actions to achieve the commonly-held goal of 
regeneration,” (Tasmania Case; Cairns et al., 2017, p. 9). Other SP interventions have multiple goals which 
require a number of complementing efforts through the process. The project goals can be framed through eight 
characteristics. Each characteristic addresses a different, yet complementing aspect of the question, and helps 
frame the intervention for the practitioners and facilitators. It is in this preparation section that Chermack's 
(2011) fifth domain of his SP theory, “Leadership Theory”, finds its first footing. “Leaders drive virtually all 
aspects of organizational life, including policy, human resource practices, structure, and compensation, among 
many, many others” (p. 53), and it is through the strength of an organisation's leadership that success will be 
found through the SP process.  
4.1.1. Epistemology  
“What level of engagement will the organisation take?” When assessing the organisational goals for a SP 
intervention, Heugens and van Oosterhout (2001) suggest making clear the epistemological characteristic of the 
scenario foundation. From the HV typology, we include this category, which frames scenarios as either taking a 
Cartesianor non-Cartesianpath. A Cartesian approach to scenario development is a purely cognitive practice 
designed to facilitate conversations which speculate about the future, whether by challenging mental models or 
expanding knowledge, and give more focus to the process than the outcomes (Biggs, et al., 2007). An example 
of this is the Massive Scenario Generation (MSG) model (Davis et al., 2007). The MSG model serves to enrich 
a planner's mental library to “help guide planning under uncertainty” (p. 51) in the moment of a potential future 
disruption. This effort is what the WKM typology calls “seeing”, where scenarios are not used to generate 
strategic options, but rather to provide illustrative examples of plausible futures. As first round scenarios, Wack 
(1985a) referred to these as first-generation or learning scenarios. Wack takes this concept further when he 
states, “If the scenario process does not bring out strategic options previously unconsidered by managers, then it 
has been sterile” (p. 10). van de Riet et al. (2008) refer to these as process-focused approaches, where the 
primary purpose is either to achieve consensus or broaden the practitioner's thinking. Non-Cartesian scenarios 
bring together the cognitive with action-oriented efforts, and link strategy formation with implementation. As 
second round scenarios, Wack (ibid) considered them decision scenarios. The WKM typology calls these 
“seeding” scenarios, where creating actionable options can illuminate a future that otherwise may not come to 
fruition. van de Riet et al. (2008) refer to these as content-focused approaches, with the aims of developing and 
evaluating policy options while identifying highly uncertain/highly impactful events. The Global Trends 2030 
scenarios used this approach by specifically sourcing feedback in the second half of the project to inform 
preparatory action in the near future for EU institutions (de Vasconcelos et al., 2012).  
4.1.2. Control  
“What control can be assumed?” This dimension is an addition to the existing typologies. A key driver in 
understanding how to manage the narratives within a SP intervention is in understanding the role the 
organisation holds within the external environment. The organisation either sees itself as holding a passive, 
reactive, preactive, proactive, or reflexive position. Organisations with a passive perspective see themselves as 
independent of the external environment. They take no active or effecting role, nor do they see themselves being 
heavily affected by environmental factors. Godet and Roubelat (1996) refer to these perspectives as ostriches, 
playing on the metaphor of sticking their head in the sand and essentially blinding themselves to any external 
activities. It may seem farfetched to assume an organisation would participate in a SP intervention, only to hold 
a passive perspective on control. However, this is precisely the reason attributed to some failures in past 
interventions. The SP team held one view of the organisation's relationship with the external environment, only 
to be countered, later, in their beliefs by the decision makers, who revealed a completely different perspective, 
resulting in no action or change being adopted. This was potentially the case with implementation stage of the 
“Netherlands in 2030” project (Omgevingsbeleid, 2000), briefly discussed by van Notten et al. (2003). Reactive 
organisations are past-oriented. Present states are less desirable than some form of the past, and perspectives 
may favour a backwards looking perspective. A positive expression of this perspective are firemen and the 
development of fire safety protocols and regulations (Godet and Roubelat, 1996). Reactive perspectives are held 
in risk-management scenarios, such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) disaster scenarios, 
developed for internal and cross-discipline response to natural disasters (FEMA, 2018). Preactive perspectives 
are forward looking, where the organisation holds some form of control within, to navigate external forces that 
are out of their control. Contingency planning, such as insurance policies, are products of preactive perspectives. 
For both reactive and preactive perspectives, organisations look to adapt to changing external conditions 
(Gordon, 2011). Proactive perspectives are forward looking as well, but see the organisation as an active player 
that can provoke change and design the future around their goals. Reflexive perspectives see circular 
relationships between the external and internal environments. The external environment affects the abilities, 
resources, and perceptions of the organisation, and in return, the efforts of the organisation affect the 
functioning and perceptions of the external environment, creating a feedback loop (Soros, 2013). Proactive and 
reflexive perspectives hold the potential for the organisation to intervene on future conditions for the purpose of 
creating better conditions (Gordon, 2011).  
4.1.3. Value/reality  
“What will be the value/reality relationship?” The next dimension highlights the desirability included in 
developing scenario states. Scenarios include descriptive, normative, or dynamic categories. Descriptive 
scenarios present possible futures without accounting for the level of desirability of those outcomes. They are an 
exploration of possible outcomes which can include baseline, reference, and non-interventions (van Notten et 
al., 2003). The VAV typology considers these contextual scenarios. The DL typology further divides descriptive 
scenarios into hypothetical and plausible sub-categories. Hypothetical scenarios offer greater explorative 
options since they can expand the farthest from reality. They hold weaker causal relationships and credulity, 
allowing for greater exploration of variables and relationships. Schultz (2015) refers to these as crazy futures, 
and even goes so far as to consider these the most useful in the SP process. This can be beneficial when 
practitioners would like to avoid the “unconscious neglect of unlikely or undesirable possibilities” (Ducot and 
Lubben, 1980, p. 52). Plausible scenarios introduce factors represented in the organisation's environment and 
can include probability statements. Plausible descriptions, however, should not be confused with the validation 
efforts of plausibility. Though related, they are not the same, and if nothing else, illustrate the obfuscating nature 
of SP terminology in the extant literature. Plausibility is further discussed in Section 3.  
Normative scenarios represent a type of “value-mindedness” (Ducot and Lubben, 1980, p. 53) guided by the 
concerns, interests, motivations, desires and occupations of the group (van de Riet et al., 2008). These scenarios 
can include prospective, strategy, policy and intervention scenarios (van Notten et al., 2003). The school of La 
Prospective takes a normative/deterministic approach to scenarios (Wilkinson and Eidinow, 2008). The HV 
typology defines normative scenarios as encompassing a continuum between the two extreme subcategories of 
active and passive. Normative scenarios with an active narrative are developed to stimulate action through 
strategic conversations evaluating policy and practice (Biggs, et al., 2007). This can be taken in hand with non-
Cartesian approaches. At the other end of the spectrum, passive involvement with normative scenarios are 
generated by content taking an observational role in the process, and using the SP intervention as a method for 
stimulating strategic conversations around norms (Heugens and van Oosterhout, 2001). This dimension can 
align with the Cartesian approach, but with a purposeful normative focus. Most agree that it may be impossible 
to create a scenario free of normative inclusions, if nothing else, at the implicit level. Ducot and Lubben (1980) 
recognise the option for a combination of descriptive and normative elements within, known as dynamic 
scenarios. These scenarios combine the value-mindedness of normative elements with descriptive realism to 
create richer scenario involvement. Examples of descriptive, normative, and especially dynamic scenarios can 
be found from scenario projects conducted through The Millennium Project. The long-rang “Millennium 3000 
Scenarios” illustrate key features of dynamic scenario development (Glenn and Gordon, 2000). Experts 
identifiedand ranked the top norms, around which to form the resulting scenarios. The scenario process linked 
the top ranked norms with explorations of uncertainties that used an experimental method, where the scenarios 
drove the model. Scenarios were built to identify actions necessary to address the stated Global Challenges.  
Though dynamic scenarios may initially give the impression of being the best of the both worlds, they can, in 
practice, result in even greater frustrations if goals and boundaries are not well defined at the start, or power 
dynamics dominate within the group(s). An example of a scenario group's value/reality relationship clashing 
during an intervention can be found in Cairns et al. (2017) “Tasmania Case”. The goals of the facilitators were 
to stimulate conversations, challenge norms, and prompt articulated action. The initial interviews and workshop 
were well attended, which generated challenging conversations, cross-disciplinary agreement, and consensus on 
the issues. However, in the latter half of the SP intervention, practitioners failed to fully engage with the 
actionable part of the intervention. They fell back on their norms in the end, and shifted responsibilities, thus 
failing to move forward with any of the potential changes they had hoped to engage.  
4.1.4. Vantage point  
“Where is the starting point?” The vantage point determines the originating point of the scenario timeline(s) 
(van Notten et al., 2003). This characteristic is divided into to three categories: forward-casting, backcasting, 
and bi-directional. Ducot and Lubben (1980, p. 51) suggest the use of hypotheses to guide the direction of the 
vantage point: “given the causes, what are the effect?”, “given the effects, what could have been the causes?” 
Though the resulting scenarios will present storylines that view time as linear, the strategic conversations that 
take place within a SP intervention can require practitioners to work with time in multi-directional and iterative 
manners (Wilkinson, 2009). Ducot and Lubben's (1980) early typology is instrumental in developing the 
groundwork for this characteristic. To help illustrate some of the more abstract dimensions of their typology, the 
authors developed a series of conical figures, which are reproduced as guides within this paper (Figs. 1 and 2).  
[insert Figures 1 & 2 about here] 
Forward-casting scenarios look for the effects (future) of a suggested set of causes (past and present) and set the 
present as the starting point to the strategic conversation. Often known as exploratory scenarios – using “the 
present or recent past as a starting point and [exploring] how the future may develop under different sets of 
assumptions” (Biggs et al., 2007, p. 3) – which utilise future inferences (e.g. trend analysis) and/or inductive 
reasoning. They build from the present state of affairs, identifying originating causal sources, and allowing for 
hypotheses of what effects could develop (Fig. 1a). Ducot and Lubben (1980) represent the scenario space 
within a cone that expands from causal sources into greater plausibility (as a function of uncertainty) as it moves 
towards the effects. Analyses can be explorative, both quantitative and qualitative, setting the stage for later 
hypothesis testing (Börjeson et al., 2006). One of the most common types of forward-casting scenarios is likely 
futures. The PV typology describes scenarios which offer likely futures to contain quantitative models, with 
established trends of the past that act like road maps into the future. Likely future scenarios more commonly 
hold to norms – and consequently are absent of disruptive events –, and include predetermined factors – events 
that have enough inertia within the system to unfold predictably over the projected time period (van der Heijden, 
1998). These scenarios can be robust scenarios (through model fitting exercises), but also limited in scope due 
to the parameters of the models and limits of purely quantitative data. Therefore, narrative descriptions can 
complement the descriptive models, creating a richer scenario story (van der Heijden et al., 2002). It is worth 
noting, though, the prophetic words of Herman Kahn, “The most likely future isn't.” The BHDEF typology 
expands on the predictive quality of forward-casting scenarios with the use of what-if scenarios. A particular 
event, or group of events, are assumed to occur and scenarios are built around this assumed skeletal framework. 
These scenarios can include predictions (often in the short-term) of future events believed to have the greatest 
importance for the organisation. The focus is on plausible events, rather than most likely or most desirable. 
Incasting is a form of what-if scenario development (Bishop et al., 2007). Participants read pre-drafted scenarios 
– usually extreme versions of alternative futures – then are tasked with describing the impacts of each future on 
a series of predetermined domains such as education, industry, technology. A popular focus for what-if 
scenarios is disaster preparedness. By combining quantitative scenario analyses with high impacting-high 
uncertainty driving forces, what-if scenarios have been used by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) to understand the potential consequences of global warming and greenhouse gas emissions and potential 
mitigating efforts (de Coninck et al., 2018), and the “Arctic Council's Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment” to 
“identify the major uncertainties that would be critical to shaping the future of Arctic marine activity to 2020 
and 2050” (Ellis and Brigham, 2009). What-if scenarios were also used to inform emergency protocols within 
the Department of Interior (DOI) that were utilized during the Deepwater Horizon oil spill (Machlis and 
McNutt, 2010). However, a series of disastrous failures in both prevention (proactive) and emergency responses 
(reactive) brought to light the failures that can come from poorly designed SP interventions, particularly ones 
that suffer from political interventions, homogeneous participation, and sticking too closely to past norms 
(Leschine et al., 2015). In response, the DOI established the Strategic Sciences Group two years later with the 
purpose of compiling “strategic scientific information and expertise” to “rapidly assemble teams of experts to 
construct interdisciplinary [science-based] scenarios of environmental crises affecting DOI resources” (DOI, 
2012).  
Backcasting scenarios develop from the opposite direction, which are prescriptive in nature, using deductive 
reasoning, with anticipatory analyses (Biggs, et al., 2007). These scenarios focus on a future event and build a 
logical, storied, flow back to the present state to help determine the path needed to reach the future event 
(Bishop et al., 2007). The DL typology suggests that anticipatory – or effectuality – scenarios can begin with 
multiple future-based hypotheses from which the story is built (Fig. 1b). Two popular methods for constructing 
backcasting scenarios are to envision ideal and crisis focused futures (though there are an uncountable number 
of other methods). Idea future scenarios are built through consensus on the type of future to aim for and 
identified trajectories to reach that future state (Pulver and VanDeveer, 2007). The La Prospective school of 
preferable scenarios coincide with this dimension. Eriksson (2004, p. 169) refers to these as visionary scenarios, 
though the methods tend to “focus on the future structure of the planning entity itself, typically allowing the 
external world to be rather sketchy”. Ackoff's (1981) reference scenarios are a version of this type, where 
projections of the future are made assuming no disruptions or exogenous changes, and include interesting and 
provocative narratives that show the types of internal changes necessary to avoid problems. Crisis focused 
scenarios are only lightly touched upon in the PV typology as a “particular future to avoid” (Pulver and 
VanDeveer, 2007, p. 5). However, the practice of crisis awareness in scenarios, for the sake of avoidance or 
survival, is a common practice. FEMA regularly use disaster scenarios coupled with role playing exercises (i.e. 
tabletop exercises) to test procedures and practices, build critical community relationships, and trouble-shoot 
issues that arise during scenario workshops (Cooper and Block, 2006; FEMA, 2018; USFA, 2018).  
Several sources also describe a blending effort of both forward-casting and backcasting within a SP 
intervention, known as bi-directional scenarios. The DL typology describes these scenarios – called mixed – as 
having multiple points from which to develop hypotheses, which require practitioners to use both causality and 
effectuality reasoning. Ducot and Lubben (1980) illustrate bi-directional scenarios with their overlapping cones 
of plausibility, recreated in Fig. 2. Bi-directional scenarios can be mid-mixed, where hypotheses of past causal 
sources and future developing effects are developed from midpoints within the scenario's relevant period (Fig. 
2a), or end-mixed, where scenarios blend the efforts of causality and effectuality relations developed in the 
exploratory and anticipatory scenarios (Fig. 2b). The present state serves as a starting point to identify future 
end-state effects, while conditions that can cause various end-states are developed in the opposite linear 
direction, creating additional sequences (Ducot and Lubben, 1980). The PV typology presents hedging scenarios 
for bi-directional scenario development. Hedging scenarios attempt to capture the full range of future 
alternatives. The purpose is to ensure that decisions made today will result in the best outcomes for the 
organisation across a range of plausible events. The other sub-category reflects a selective process in scenario 
development. Dortmans (2005, p. 274) explores the benefits of linking forward-casting and backcasting 
techniques when faced with a “dynamic strategic planning environment”. Using the Defence industry for 
backdrop, Dortmans uses established trends to base projected forecasts of evolving futures. These are 
considered within the context of strategic goals of the organisation, from which backcasting is based. Together, 
migration landscapes are developed within to provide optimal pathways of transition from present to desired 
future(s).  
4.1.5. Motivation  
“What is the motivation?” Scenarios serve to move an organisation into the future with, hopefully, more attuned 
foresight. This foresight comes from one of two possible motivations. Preserving scenarios present the most 
efficient paths towards a future target. The idea of efficiency can be operationally defined in terms of any given 
resource (economic, human, spacial, time, etc.). According to Wilkinson and Eidinow (2008), when the 
target/goal can be achieved within the existing structure, preserving scenarios are the focus. Quantitative 
measures, such as optimising modeling, or qualitative measures, such as unstructured interviews, can be part of 
the process (Börjeson et al., 2006). SP interventions motivated for policy support will often take this path (Biggs 
et al., 2007). Preserving scenarios are helpful, for example, when working through disaster preparedness policy, 
where a shared target is the speedy rescue of all citizens in danger, reinstatement of electricity, gas, and clean 
water during and after a natural disaster. Preserving scenarios help first responders understand the potentials of a 
disaster environment in order to utilise their existing channels of communication and equipment in the most 
efficient ways possible during rescue efforts, in order to minimise/eliminate human death tolls. However, in the 
private sector, preserving scenarios can also reinforce existing norms and biases, stifling exploratory thinking 
and ultimately failing to challenge mental models. Transforming scenarios, on the other hand, present paths of 
development that reveal the potential for an organisation to change a fundamental element of its behaviour in 
order to either achieve targets or avoid potential crises. These categories originate from the BHDEF typology, 
but with additional applications. Both the BHDEF and WE typologies consider these categories normative in 
nature, with transforming scenarios resigned to purely backcasting efforts. However, there are a number of 
scenario interventions that have proven to be forward-casting in design, with transforming elements. Dortmans 
(2005) presents this very method in his review of the Defence sector approaches.  
4.1.6. Application  
“How will scenarios be applied?” Key to any SP intervention is determining, at the start, how the organisation 
wants to apply the outcomes (insights, knowledge, and stories) of the intervention. This characteristic is 
provided by the VAV typology, with two categories: generic and specific. Generic scenarios are developed with 
a general use in mind. They do not focus on a specific problem, but offer objectivelevel stories of the future that 
can be used by any number of sectors and organisations to help inform their own developments. Scenarios that 
take a long-term time horizon will often be generic in their story telling. Specific scenarios closely focus on pre-
determined details, such as issues in policy and practice, take a more in-depth exploration. Specific scenarios 
can be used to test such efforts as Dutch transportation infrastructure policy evaluation (van de Riet et al., 2008), 
Sweden's pursuit of crime prevention (Lindgren and Bandhold, 2003), and public school cohesion (Goens, 
1999). The VAV typology acknowledges that it may also be the case that general efforts are initially made to lay 
the ground work for various specific paths. Though it is difficult to fully realise a priori the applicability of the 
scenarios that will emerge from an intervention, it is important, all the same, to understand the dimensions of 
this characteristic. If a scenario team can clarify their project goals (Section 1) and anticipate features of the 
scenario impact (Section 4), then they have a better chance of increasing the success of their SP intervention 
efforts.  
4.1.7. Subject  
“What is the subject focus?” This characteristic comes from the VRVR typology and defines the particular 
subject(s) of the SP intervention. The details of the subject will determine, in large part, which variables the 
practitioners focus their attentions. van Notten et al. (2003), provide the first three categories, issue-based, area-
based, and institutional-based. Issue-based scenarios are concerned with societal issues, such as the judicial 
system of Sweden's scenario workshops to better understand the future crime arena (Lindgren and Bandhold, 
2003), Australia's gender pay gap (Jefferson and Preston, 2005), and immigration (Migration Data Portal, 2017), 
but can also be concerned with what the WKM typology refers to as grandchallenges. These are issues of 
immeasurable scale, often with high levels of uncertainty, such as the “Global-Change Scenarios” developed for 
the US Climate Change Science Program (Parson et al., 2007). Area-based scenarios cover geographical areas 
(e.g. boroughs, regions, and borders). Institutional-based scenarios cover concerns from within the organisation. 
The WKM typology calls this category single-client focused scenarios, which are largely concerned with the 
issues surrounding a government or company. A fourth category is included, cross-based. Though van Notten, 
et al., mention the practiced method of blending several subjects in a single SP intervention, they do not 
formally include this into their VRVR typology. Sometimes the focal subject is not clear, and part of the 
scenario process is to determine where the practitioners’ collective focus should lie. An example of this is with 
the “Tasmania Case” (Cairns et al., 2017). To set the agenda for the workshops, semi-structured interviews were 
held with a heterogeneous group (n = 81) of stakeholders to determine where their perceptions aligned on the 
critical issues. These early interviews helped determine whether the issues were outside the region (area-based), 
or within the culture (issue-based), and how much control could conceivably be exerted over their changes.  
4.1.8. Variable scale  
“Where is the variable focus?” Though discussed widely in numerous reviews and papers, only the VRVR 
typology includes a “variable” dimension (see variable mixture in Section 3). The CSI typology, however, 
divides the key features of scenario variables across two sections and three categories, representing the different 
dimensions that serve different purposes. Practitioners will focus on one or all of the following categories: 
external, internal, and policy.  
External, exogenous variables are “those fundamental forces that bring about change or movement in the 
patterns and trends that we identify as underpinning observable events in the world” (van der Heijden et al., 
2002, p. 282). These variables act upon the organisation, are difficult or impossible to control, and carry the 
potential to impact an organisation's achievements in reaching their goals and affecting their motivation (Biggs, 
et al., 2007). Some examples are technological, ecological, and political developments (van Notten et al., 2003). 
The BHDEF typology refers to these as external scenarios, which help develop and assess policies and 
strategies, but can be general with broad target groups. The VRVR typology labels these macro variables, and 
considers them the exclusive territory of institutional-based scenarios. However, the CSI typology expands the 
applicability of external, macro variables to hold the potential to act upon any subject under consideration, not 
just institutions. By focusing on the macro level, Gordon (2011, p. 77) suggests that the organisation is looking 
to adapt to the external environment, rather than influence it, in their bid to “improve their competitive 
alignment with future opportunities”. Internal variables are endogenous, internal driving forces that are more 
controllable (to an extent) and part of the organisational system, such as organisational culture, time frame, and 
leadership (Biggs et al., 2007; Keough and Shanaha, 2008). The VRVR typology refers to these as meso 
variables that encompass transactional scenarios, with factors under direct influence of the organisation (e.g. 
clients, suppliers, organisational culture, and interest groups). The BHDEF typology refers to these as strategic 
scenarios that define target factors with a range of potential consequences in order to test such things as policy 
impact, to ultimately inform strategic decisions. Policy variables are often focused in goal-oriented, normative 
scenarios, with either a content or process focus, in order to test procedures against desired targets (Amer et al., 
2013; Dreborg, 2002; van de Riet et al., 2008). This is the case when using Fuzzy Cognitive Maps – a method of 
using causal cognitive maps for scenario development – to study and analyse foreign policy, social policies, and 
more (Craiger et al., 1996; Kosko, 1997; Mago et al., 2013). Policy variables play a central role in the problem-
focused approach of the WE typology, where legalistic decision-making cultures associated with policy making 
are involved. Of course, any combination of these variables can be considered in a single intervention through 
multi-scale methods. Details of the project goals will largely determine which variable categories are designated 
for focus and exploration. An example of multi-scale scenarios can be found in the Equalities and Human Rights 
Advisor Group (EHRAG) workshops aimed at determining various forms of impact from social policies 
designed for citizens (e.g. remote, elderly, single home dwellers) and special interest groups (e.g. Age Scotland 
and Enable Scotland) with consideration of environmental factors (e.g. seasonal shifts and global warming) 
(Audit Scotland, 2019).  
4.1.9. Horizon  
“How far away is the future?” For every possible future point, there is a scenario discussing it. This 
characteristic identifies the time line for the scenarios. The VRVR typology recognises two categories, short-
term and long-term – called time scale. van Notten et al. (2003) state that short-term scales cover 3-10 years and 
long-term scales cover more than 25 years in the future. The VRVR typology offers a good starting point, but 
practice shows that further nuances are required to better capture the different scenario profiles. Shell creates 
scenarios ranging from 6 months to 50 years. Kahn et al. (1976) offer scenarios projected across 200 years into 
the future. Linneman and Klein (1979) review a sample of firms who regularly use scenario analysis as part of 
their planning strategies. Their surveys reveal a bimodal distribution at five and 10 years. These peak year 
projections appear repeatedly in the majority of the scenario reports featured in this paper. Building on such 
discoveries and real-world use, the CSI typology attempts to offer a more nuanced division of the horizon as 
short-term, medium-term, long-term, and congruent. Short-term horizons look no farther than five years into the 
future. Medium-term horizons focus on fairly distant futures that fall between five to 10 years. Long-term 
horizons take a long-range view that can reach generationally and span more than 10 years into the future. The 
farther into the future a scenario projects, the more general the scenario content tends to become, as a factor of 
uncertainty (Schnaars, 1987; Zentner, 1975). A mixture of congruent, target horizons (short- to long-term) can 
be found in the “Empowering Europe's Future” scenarios (Grevi et al., 2013). Beginning in the year of 
publication – 2013 – multiple dimension-specific scenarios plot projected paths to the year 2050. As a result, the 
congruent horizons offer various levels of detail for strategy development. The more nuanced implications of 
options for the EU are plotted against the scenarios’ short-term horizons (1-5 years), and projections for global 
engagement are plotted against the scenarios’ long-term horizons (up to 37 years) – however these latter efforts 
are told with more broad stroke storylines.  
4.1.10. Geographic scope  
“Where are the geographic boundaries?” The geographic scope defines the physical boundaries of interest. The 
VRVR typology lists two categories, global/supranational and national/local. However, these categories are 
further divided within the body of the literature to give a range beginning at the “global level, to supranational 
areas, to national, to... regional areas, and finally to local areas” (van Notten et al., 2003, p. 431). The CSI 
typology divides each of these geographic areas into their own discrete category - global, supranational, 
national, regional, and local – and includes an overlapping category, which takes into account the opportunities 
for scenarios to strategically focus on any combination of categories. This is illustrated in several of FEMA's 
tabletop scenario exercises where experts from different sectors (local to federal, private to public) work 
together in testing and further developing scenarios to ensure their various arenas work in a cohesive manner to 
expedite safety protocols before, during, and after natural disasters (FEMA, 2018). Wollenberg et al. (2000) 
include a necessary focus on the interrelatedness of the global, national, regional, and local overlapping 
boundaries when adapting SP to community forest management. van Notten et al. (2003) also recognise the 
occasional practice of developing scenarios with overlapping boundaries, but at the time, state that little more 
than simplistic efforts had been attempted. Simplistic or not, the CSI typology recognises this category as a 
unique profile due to its use and potential. Biggs et al. (2007) recognise that linking variables, content, and 
ultimately the message, in overlapping boundaries can be difficult. Some variables are geographic-specific and 
can lose their intended meaning when practitioners attempt up- or down-scaling of content. It is important to 
note that there are institutions, such as NASA, that regularly develop scenarios to include celestial events. 
However, their main focus is the impact and effects upon the planet, and so, fit into global-scope scenarios 
(NASA, 2019).  
4.2. Section 2: Process design  
The second section aims to answer the question, “How are you going to do it?” This section divides the 
components of the active scenario process. The title is provided from the VRVR typology, but is expanded to 
include additional categories. In previous typologies, there are few to no provisions to address the practitioners 
of a SP intervention, though they are discussed at length in other reviews and case-studies. Since there cannot be 
a SP intervention without practitioners, and practitioners affect every aspect of a SP intervention – from setting 
the agenda to determining outcomes – it seems appropriate to include this dimension as a necessary 
characteristic to any SP typology.  
4.2.1. Practitioners  
“Who will create the scenarios?” Depending on the desires and resources of an organisation, practitioners can be 
recruited from any number of sectors, professions, and groups. The recognised categories for the CSI typology 
are facilitators, problem owners, experts, employees, stakeholders, community, and cross-populations. This is 
one of the most important dimensions of any SP intervention. Those who participate in developing the scenarios 
will be the ones who gain the greatest knowledge from the intervention. This is due, in no small part, to the 
process of challenging the mental models of the practitioners. The practice helps “forge new common 
vocabulary and a rethink of the units of analysis” (Wilkinson, 2009, p. 108). This dimension highlights the third 
domain, “Mental Model Theory”, of Chermack's (2011, p. 48) SP theory, to which he states, “Mental models 
encompass people's assumptions, values, experiences, beliefs, and ideas. Reperceiving the organization and its 
environment is thought to occur through learning that forces participants to reexamine their assumptions and 
alter their mental models.” Due to the gravity of such learning, the general consensus is that the practitioners 
should include the decision makers (see Section 4).  
Generally, it is necessary to have a facilitator guide the scenario process, in order to keep the project on track 
and guide practitioners through the multiple stages of the SP intervention. Facilitators are scenario experts, 
referred to as analysts in VAV typology. Bradfield et al. (2005) argue that a good facilitator can be the 
difference between success and failure in a scenario workshop. Facilitators help carry out and present the 
scenario analysis to the client. Expert opinions are sourced when specialised knowledge of the organisation, 
subject, a group of actors, environmental factors, and/or spacial scales are required. Brown considers an expert 
to be one who has a large amount of relevant knowledge, as well as “a cultivated sensitivity to its relevance 
which permeates [their] intuitive insight” (Brown, 1968, p. 13) Masini and Vasquez (2000, p. 57) also consider 
experts as those persons “with the capacity to doubt” and the willingness to accept when they are wrong, within 
the SP process. Lindgren and Bandhold (2003, p. 33) suggest facilitators, and other workshop members such as 
experts, should come from outside the organisation, “at some stages in the scenario process in order to bring 
external perspectives into the process.” There are two sub-categories of experts, inhouse and remarkable people. 
Inhouse experts (i.e. intercompany panels) are from within the organisation and hold a highly specialised 
knowledge of key elements, applicable analyses, or otherwise bring an in-depth perspective of the organisation 
to SP (von der Gracht, 2008). Remarkable people (e.g. field experts, consultants), on the other hand, are experts 
“not normally part of the organisation's network” (van der Heijden, 1998, p. 184). Remarkable people serve 
specifically to challenge the business-as-usual thinking that may be implicitly employed by the practitioners in 
the SP intervention. As van der Heijden (ibid) describes, these are “experts who can produce an insightful ‘aha’ 
reaction from the client”. Though mostly applied to remarkable people, experts, in general, are often brought in 
after predetermined or critical uncertainties are identified, but require more elaboration and exploration than the 
SP can provide (Cairns and Wright, 2018).  
The VAV typology highlights the problem owners as potential members of an intervention. These are often the 
managers initially seeking insights for their project goals, and who will ultimately hold responsibility for the 
outcomes. Employees, much like inhouse experts and problem owners, come from within the organisation, and 
can span any level or sector – management, executives, CEOs, soldiers, administrators, and labourers, for 
example. Stakeholders are included in a SP intervention to ensure knowledge sharing from special-interest 
groups that hold a vested interest in the outcomes. Community members can also be valuable members to a 
scenario group, by bringing in a variety of specialty knowledge afforded those with an intimate relationship with 
their environment (e.g. residents and shop owners), not otherwise attainable through other methods. For 
example, Rawluk and Godber (2011) modified their scenario technique to ensure the Kuna Yala community 
members of Ukupdesi, Panama – who were historically marginalised at the time (women and youth) – were able 
to fully contribute in the SP project. Men, women, and youth were prevented from participating in a more 
traditional SP workshop settings due to cultural norms of gender and age public collaborations. In response, the 
authors devised alternative methods to interview community groups and then later, to integrate the whole 
community's input together. It is also the case that more elaborate SP interventions will recruit knowledge from 
some or all of these categories in cross-population efforts. These efforts often take more time, involving several 
group sessions, different platforms for communication, and can require extensive resources.  
4.2.2. Groups  
“How varied is the knowledge?” As important as it is to determine who will create the scenarios, so too is the 
variety of knowledge within the practitioner groups. The composition of the group, as much as the process, are 
“crucial determinants of the outcomes” of any SP intervention (Hodgkinson and Healey, 2008, p. 439). Like the 
previous, this category is not addressed in extant typologies, though it is discussed at some length throughout 
the SP literature. There are two categorical groups, homogeneous and heterogeneous. A homogeneous group is 
composed of a focused group of practitioners with closely defined boundaries, who may offer an in-depth 
perspective. Boundaries can be determined by their experience, age, profession, or education, for example. 
These groups can be limited to upper management/board members, stakeholder workshops, expert interviews, or 
any other focus-oriented group. Parson, et al. (2007, p. 65) describe a homogeneous SP group as users who 
“have some degree of agreement on what values they are trying to advance, what issues are relevant, and what 
choices are feasible, acceptable, and within their power and authority.” Parson, et al. (ibid.) further elaborate 
that large groups can also be homogeneous when they share “their interests and perspectives, e.g., scenarios for 
property and casualty insurers, for organized labor in the United States, or for European environmental groups.” 
A heterogeneous group of practitioners provides different demographic characteristics. A heterogenous group 
can also be referred to as a mixed group. A group of this description will provide a wide range, even disparate 
selection, of backgrounds (von der Gracht, 2008), cognitive styles (Hodgkinson and Clarke, 2007), agencies 
(Wright, Bradfield, and Cairns, 2013), education levels, relationships to the project (FEMA, 2018), expertise 
(van Der Fels‐Klerx, Goossens, Saatkamp, and Horst, 2002), objectives and interests (Van 't Klooster and van 
Asselt, 2006), stakeholder and community involvement (Lindgren and Bandhold, 2003; Rawluk and Godber, 
2011), and/or differently framed information (Yaniv, 2011). Stewart (2008) touches upon an important 
evaluation of the type of knowledge that is brought into a SP intervention. The author suggests that one of the 
main criteria in any SP method is to employ a “diversity of worldviews” (p. 3). Since diversity (i.e. 
heterogeneity) can be determined on any number of factors it is best left to be judged on a case-by-case basis by 
the facilitators (Hodgkinson and Healey, 2008). Homogeneity and heterogeneity are, in principle, mutually 
exclusive, since any deviation from group similarity is to introduce diversity, which is a feature of 
heterogeneity. However, these two categories could also be seen as polar ends of a spectrum, where each 
variation in group boundaries or demographics moves the whole of the group from one extreme form of 
homogeneity to ever increasing forms of heterogeneity.  
4.2.3. Data  
“What information is collected?” Though there is an immense amount of information that can be used to inform 
scenario development and testing, both the VRVR typology and the VAV typology offer a succinct division of 
data, quantitative and qualitative. Quantitative scenarios are generally discussed in terms of modelling to both 
develop projections as well as test for robustness. The “25 by 25” policy, for example, had a goal of deriving 
25% of electricity and motor fuels from renewable sources by 2025, within the US. To consider the potential 
impacts of renewable energy requirements, Bryant and Lempert (2010) used their scenario discovery model to 
guide practitioners and produce quantitative assessments from defined parameters and datasets. Quantitative 
scenarios can also refer to the data referenced to inform scenarios, such as the national census (Cairns et al., 
2017), sales reports (Eppen et al., 1989), and even weather patterns (Pipher, 2014). The uncertainties are 
quantifiable within the time frame, with translatable values, such as probabilities, confidence intervals, and 
likelihood scores, where techniques such as Delphi (NISTEP Report, 2001) and multi-criteria decision analysis 
(Montibeller et al., 2006) are integrated into the SP interventions. The probabilistic approach is used with 
quantitative uncertainties (e.g. risk and stochastic uncertainties), when the plausible alternative future scenarios 
obey the same fundamental logic (Dreborg, 2002; Eriksson, 2004). Quantitative analyses are more commonly 
used for short-term horizons, largely due to the compounding uncertainties as time stretches farther away from 
the present (Fauré et al., 2017). Biggs et al. (2007) refer to quantitative approaches as hard, developing formal 
models where sourced information is formal, rational, and can include scientific observations. Conversely, the 
authors refer to qualitative approaches as soft, where personal, expert judgment and intuition, along with local 
knowledge and world views are sourced for data. Qualitative scenarios are used to help illustrate high levels of 
uncertainty, within complex situations, and use narratives to relate information (Biggs, et al., 2007; van Notten 
et al., 2003). Such data may include human values (i.e. norms), emotions, behaviours (Cairns et al., 2017), and 
historical content (Bradfield et al., 2016).  
However, as is often the case with SP interventions, both quantitative and qualitative methods are used, and 
therefore, provide the CSI typology with a third category, complimenting. Quantitative, or semi-quantitative, 
information such as probabilities, trends, and national statistics can offer a strong picture of behavioural trends 
and differences, while qualitative information, such as first-hand accounts and creative explorations of potential 
outcomes between factors, can enrichen the story and help make the abstract elements more relatable, thus 
complimenting the story of each style. “The Trend Report” (Gros and Alcidi, 2013), commissioned by the 
European Strategy and Policy Analysis System (ESPAS), relies heavily on three quantitative, model-based 
analyses – two global and one scaled for the European sector. The resulting reference scenario includes 51 
figure and table projections up to the years 2030, 2050, and one as far ahead as 2100. Though qualitative data 
were gathered from policy and industry experts, the scenario is severely limited in scope on a number of key 
issues, admits to not acknowledging a range of other key variables and relationships (i.e. climate change) and 
maintains many of the norms and trends mapped up to 2013.  
4.2.4. Data collection  
“How is the information collected?” Much like the data characteristic, the manner in which data are collected 
can vary with every SP intervention. The title is borrowed from the VRVR typology, with an expanded profile. 
At the start of any scenario process, practitioners must go on fact-finding missions, the products of which will 
inform the remainder of the sessions (List, 2005), though a key tenet of SP is to allow, even encourage, new 
information to be added and incorporated at any stage within the process (Wright et al., 2009). The VRVR 
typology recognises two categories, participatory and desk research.  
Participatory methods include interviews, brainstorming sessions, think tanks, group discussions, surveys, 
workshops, Delphi-style ranking scores, incasting, role playing, storytelling, intuitive logic, visioning, and focus 
groups (Bishop et al., 2007; Dator, 2009; de Vasconcelos et al., 2012; Grevi et al., 2013; Teufel et al., 2013; van 
de Riet et al., 2008). This dimension is usually group-based work, but can also include one-on-one sessions. The 
VAV typology considers data gathering efforts such as surveys and closed interviews as single-way interactions, 
open interviews and similar as two-way interactions, and workshops or any other types of group interactive 
sessions as multiple-way interactions. This is an active method of data collection, and the first domain of 
Chermack's (2011) unifying theory of SP “Dialogue, Conversation Quality, and Engagement”. Some 
participatory techniques used to elicit and organise qualitative input into meaningful information can be found 
in the IL school. Early in the process, practitioners are asked to brainstorm about the key driving forces within 
the business environment, then cluster them together by closely linked causal connections (Cairns and Wright, 
2018). Ramírez and Wilkinson (2014) point out that intuitive data is difficult, if impossible to validate. 
However, the authors suggest that the act of intuitive inquiry is not to reveal accurate predictions of the future, 
but to make explicit the norms, assumptions of the practitioners, and reframe what is plausible.  
Desk research, on the other hand, is a passive method, that can be carried out individually. This includes such 
efforts as literature research, data mining, clustering, and computer simulations (van Notten et al., 2003). 
Dynamic modelling is one popular method of desk research. Models are developed to better understand systems 
complexity and how decisions can affect system behaviour. Generally, models produce either a snapshot of a 
current state or dynamic projections of different futures. These understandings are achieved through abstractions 
and simplifications of the environment (Iwaniec et al., 2014). Models can enhance scenarios, or scenarios can 
parameterize models, depending on the goals of the practitioners. Systems modelling has been integrated with 
SP to help understand “emergent, system-level behaviors that result from the interaction of variables in different 
subsets of complex systems,” in order to explore real world challenges and solutions (Allington et al., 2018, p. 
3). Agent-based modelling was used to enhance SP for the tourism industry by parameterizing human behaviour 
in order to reinforce strategic aspects of planning (Johnson and Sieber, 2011).  
More extensive SP interventions often employ both methods of data collection. This third category is called 
blended. Examples of a blended method of data collection are illustrated in several scenarios commissioned by 
ESPAS, where trend- and impact-analyses are reported alongside creative narratives of plausible future 
developments. Allington et al. (2018), for example, used desk research methods, including quantitative systems 
dynamic modelling, with qualitative participatory scenario planning in a heterogeneous group to identify factors 
that could affect the future sustainability of the Mongolian Plateau, a transboundary social-ecological system. 
Their purpose was not to create predictions, but to “refine and formalize the qualitative conceptualizations of 
scenarios outlined by stakeholders, and to explore how differences between the scenarios can lead to similar or 
divergent futures” (p. 11).  
Though data collection is typically, and for practical reasons, early in the process, there is no true completion to 
the inclusion of new data. There is no universal “right” length of time to collect data. The purpose is to gather 
enough information to successfully inform the rest of the process and subsequent strategic decisions. It is 
possible to have too little data, thus leaving practitioners – and by extension the organisation – blind to plausible 
alternatives. However, what constitutes “too little” and “too much” is difficult, possibly impossible, to quantify 
and will depend on the other resources of the interventions (e.g. time, cost, group size, individual members, 
goals, and perspectives). Some suggest that data collection should cease when a saturation point is reached. That 
is to say, when the effort to find more novel information is greater than the quality of the discovered 
information, then Lincoln and Guba (1985) call this saturation. Data collection should cease in its present efforts 
for the sake of advancing to the next stage in the process, but not necessarily for the remainder of the process 
(Bowen, 2008; Ringland, 2006).  
4.2.5. Resources  
“How much can be invested in the process?” The title comes from the VRVR typology and reflects the amount 
of available resources an organisation is willing or able to invest in a SP intervention. This characteristic offers 
three categories, extensive, limited, or complex resources. The first two categories are a bit self-explanatory. 
Extensive resources reflect such profiles as sustained numbers of practitioners/ groups over several workshop 
sessions, with sufficient financial backing, and available data. Limited resources can be experienced in any 
number of sub-categories as well. However, this category reflects a ubiquitous limitation in resources. Common 
examples are community-based charities, grass-roots organisations, and advocacy groups. Arguably, the 
resource characteristic can be divided into several discrete characteristics. However, at the sake of creating what 
may be an unending division of resources, a third category is offered as a means of including efficiency into the 
CSI typology. A complex profile of resources reflects an extensive supply of some resources, a limited supply 
of others, and any potential changes in availability. The Scottish Government initiative to have greater input 
from local constituents led to the creation of a citizens advisory group (Audit Scotland, 2019). EHRAG was 
established to crowdsource knowledge from third-sector organisations to improve policy development and 
implementation. A series of SP workshops were developed as part of the initiative. Though financial and 
institutional resources were readily available, attendance was low due to time and distance constraints of the 
practitioners. Due to the needs of their daily lives (job, family, etc.) the community members were severely time 
restricted, which reflected in low levels of workshop attendance.  
4.2.6. Institutional conditions  
“How much manoeuverability is available?” The VRVR typology is the only typology to includes this 
characteristic. van Notten et al. (2003, p. 432) note that room to manoeuvre can also be recognised as an 
institutional resource, but argue, “that the resources tend to be transparent whereas the institutional conditions 
are often more illusive”. We agree with van Notten et al., and add that, arguably, any number of the 
characteristics in this typology could be identified as a “resource”. However, this overly broad application of the 
definition of “resource” is not conducive to a functioning typology, and the differences between conditions and 
resources are great enough without resulting in extensive, reducible divisions, to include in a SP typology. 
Institutional conditions can be open, constrained, or structured.  
Open conditions are reflected in a limitation of norms as driving factors in scenario development, and a higher 
freedom of creativity. Wright et al. (2013) offer a good description, “a politically-safe team learning 
environment and a rich learning process that stimulates creativity.” An extreme example of open conditions 
throughout a full scenario process is provided with the “Digital Futures Final Report”, from the European 
Commission DG CNECT (2016). In order to source insights from the broadest community (n = 3500), the core 
team used a learn-by-doing approach which resulted in altering their initial approach to one of “an informal 
open-ended process fueled by the spontaneous interest of participants” (p. 24). Constrained conditions can be 
experienced when institutional boundaries, biases, dominant views, political clashes, cultural norms, or other 
normative characteristics limit the exploratory efforts (van Notten et al., 2003). Constrained conditions can often 
be encountered within the private industry, where sensitive information is privileged, and information flow is 
opaque. Structured conditions offer boundaries, but still enable exploratory work. Structured scenarios may have 
a framework or scaffolding that was determined in a pre-process. This framework is presented alongside the 
project goals for practitioners to ground the scenario narratives. The “Global Europe 2050” project used 
structured conditions for scenario building (Commission, 2011). Their team of experts were presented with six 
main dimensions of the future, upon which they provided their own information in a free-mode approach with 
“unconstrained and unconventional representation of possible long term futures” (p. 4). The result was three 
highly diverse scenarios, each representing the six dimensions in an increasing order of sensitivity (i.e. 
uncertainty), as predetermined by the scenario.  
4.3. Section 3: Scenario content  
The third section answers the question, “What is included?” Again, the title is provided from the VRVR 
typology's overarching themes, with expansions. This section presents the dimensions that develop within the 
scenarios. If using the CSI typology for prospective purposes, the question could be reframed to ask, “What do 
we want to include?” or “What do we want to avoid including?” In previous typologies, uncertainty is 
discussed, but not incorporated as an independent dimension. Uncertainty is inherent in the process, and the key 
motivator for initiating a SP intervention, therefore the topic is represented in the CSI typology through two 
separate dimensions, one in the scenario content and another in the scenario impact sections. The section takes a 
look at both the individual scenario, as well as the relationship between multiple scenarios.  
4.3.1 Temporal nature 
“Which temporal outlook does the scenario present?”4 The title of this characteristic comes from the VRVR 
typology, and focuses at the individual scenario. The temporal characteristic presents the quality of time within 
the scenario story. There are three categories: chain, snapshot, and varied. Chain scenarios present a continuous 
storyline that illustrates developing relationships. For backcasting scenarios, these can link the end goal(s) to 
beginning state(s). Chain storylines can include cascading consequences which originate from a single source, 
as in the “US Geological Survey Appalachian (Bsal)” scenarios created to proactively prepare for a specific 
fungal disease (Bsal) outbreak (Hopkins et al., 2018), or time paths of development (van de Riet et al., 2008). 
Snapshot scenarios present a comprehensive view of a single point in time (Biggs et al., 2007; Godet and 
Roubelat, 1996), such as an in-depth description of the Dutch economy at a specified horizon (van de Riet et al., 
2008). The VAV typology refers to these first two categories as continuous and discrete, respectively. Varied 
scenarios present a zoom-in-and-out effort. One form of varied scenarios shows continuous developments of 
events, with specific stop-gaps within the storyline that can serve as checks or bifurcation points, where in-depth 
attention is given. Bifurcation points, for instance, could be disruptions (Worthington et al., 2009), wicked 
problems (Wright et al., 2018), or catastrophes (Godet and Roubelat, 1996). Another form is presented by van 
Notten, et al., (2003), who mention scenarios that present mainly the end-state, with only an implicit discussion 
on the path towards the  
end-state.  
4.3.2. Complexity  
“How many factors are represented in the scenario?” This characteristic addresses the numeracy of the features 
within a single scenario. There are two categories, low and high. Low complexity scenarios are more simplistic 
scenarios with fewer variables. These tend to present either a snapshot of a single moment in time, where, 
regardless of the variety of details, there is little room for elaboration, or a distant, long-term scenario where 
uncertainty is high which limits the amount of detail that can confidently be afforded to a scenario. High 
complexity scenarios, on the other hand, tend to be those that present a continuous story, with elaborative 
developments of relationships between factors, possibly crossing several disciplines. Though complex snapshots 
are possible, as well. High complexity could also refer to the number of scenarios developed from a single 
intervention. Kahn and Wiener's book “The Year 2000: A framework for speculation on the next thirty-three 
years” (1967) is an example of a project incorporating both an extreme variety of factors within a scenario, as 
well as several different scenarios overall. A potential drawback to highly complex scenarios, however, is that 
the sheer volume of information may be overwhelming, and the intended audience may get lost in the details, 
thus rendering the potential messages of the scenarios opaque.  
4.3.3. Integration  
“How connected is the story?” This category is closely linked with complexity but holds its own distinctions. 
The VRVR typology recognises two mutually exclusive categories within this characteristic: low vs high. A low 
level of integration has little interconnectedness within the scenarios and partially inform the exercises for the 
focal groups (e.g. organisations, departments, or stakeholders) (Biggs et al., 2007). Competing lines of 
development are contained within separate boundaries. The “Global Warming of 1.5 °C” (de Coninck et al., 
2018) scenario project used an overarching focal point – increasing global temperatures – and created 
 
4 Inayatullah (1993) discusses various metaphors of time within the realm of futures theory. Time, he posits, is constructed differently, depending on 
a number of factors, and has many perspectives. Though a full discussion of the theoretical position of time and time's relationship to scenarios is 
beyond the scope of this paper, it is important to note that the temporal nature of scenario stories should be understood as reflections of the audience 
for which they are intended, and not merely an ‘arrow’ pointing in a single direction.  
recommendations for various global responses. The details of their global responses included a variety of 
adaptation and transformational actions that translated differently, depending on the stakeholder (e.g. countries, 
regions, cities, communities or businesses). Highly integrated scenarios, however, express the overlapping 
perspectives, uncertainties, and developments that may unfold between the separate focal groups (Biggs et al., 
2007; van Notten et al., 2003). For example, the “VERA-Forward Visions on the European Research Area” 
(VERA; Teufel et al., 2013, p. 5) scenarios were specifically designed to “help stakeholders with a diverse range 
of backgrounds and perspectives to arrive at a joint understanding of key challenges and define settings for 
addressing them.” VERA included four scenarios which linked different sectors across the EU on the 
governance of research, technology, development and innovation (RTDI), for the next 17 years. As a result, the 
scenarios, though extensive as a collective, were only able to “display central ideas about the futures of RTDI” 
(ibid.) in order to be communicable and timely for all stakeholders.  
4.3.4. Theme  
“What future images emerge?” Dator (2009) offers four archetypal future images that encapsulates the possible 
selections of scenarios. Many others have also produced their own selections of archetypes, or generic scenario 
themes, including Inayatullah's (2008) six pillars, Boschetti et al. (2016) six meta-archetypes, the Global 
Scenario Group's three archetypes (Gallopín and Raskin, 2002), and Hunt's et al. (2012) convergent of four 
archetypes for stakehold engagements. These are meant to be generic images of the future, where qualities are 
not necessarily good or bad, but rather summarise the common content of each archetype, which distinguishes 
one from the others. Scenario archetypes primarily reduce to Dator's original four – growth, collapse, 
disciplined, transformational – plus wild card. Dator recognises that scenarios have the potentials to overlap 
across archetypes, but that most will naturally fall within one.  
Growth scenarios project an image of the future which builds on the idea of a growing economy, society, 
technological advances, etc. Past and present states serve as sources for the trend which informs the particular 
behaviour of projected “growth”. Collapse scenarios envision a future where growth is unsustainable, and 
eventually leads to some form of integral collapse of one or several systems. These may be economic, resource, 
moral, cultural, technological collapses, or any number of other areas of our shared environments, which lead to 
a lower stage of development than is presently experienced. Collapse scenarios can represent a beneficial trend 
for some (such as the collapse of a repressive oligarchy) or such themes as Gallopín and Raskin's (2002) 
barbarization, where conventional strategies eventually prove inadequate for addressing external stresses, 
ultimately fail, and result in either breakdowns of systems or fortress worlds where privilege and stability are 
secured through authoritarian measures. When present trends prove unsustainable, such as with collapse 
scenarios, structural uncertainty can help explore conditions of structural change, such as trend-breaks (Dreborg, 
2002). Dator (2009) notes that in his experience, most futurists don't want to consider collapse storylines of the 
future, and often avoid them, even though he – and many others – believe they should. Discipline scenarios are 
those that see sustained growth of present trends as an unviable option in the future and refocus on survival of 
the system(s). They highlight fundamental values (e.g. natural, spiritual, religious, political, or cultural) and 
become disciplined around them. Inayatullah's (2008) back-to-the-future pillar falls within the Discipline 
category. Transformational scenarios anticipate and welcome fundamental changes, even paradigmatic changes, 
to the system. Dator focusses heavily on technological changes, but these changes can reach well beyond this 
single sector. The final archetypal scenarios are wild cards. These are images of the future which go beyond the 
known knowns (predetermined) and known unknowns (critical uncertainties), and attempt to grapple with the 
true nature of disruptions by reaching towards the unknown unknowns and introduce novelties. Variations of 
these themes can be found in the 2050 global scenarios developed for the The Millennium Project. For example, 
the “Global Normative 2050 Scenario” features extraterrestrial encounters and includes the passage, “In 2040, 
when the Mars Pioneers won the first Olympic competition in solar sailing between earth and lunar orbits, 
humanity seemed to pass some threshold of consciousness” (Glenn, 1998).  
4.3.5. Dynamics  
“How extreme is the scenario?” The DL typology was the first to introduce this characteristic and divides it 
between two the extreme categories trend and peripheral, with an acknowledgement that these lie on a 
spectrum, where a blending of the two is possible. The CSI typology acknowledges this blended category as 
compound scenarios.  
Trend and peripheral scenarios get their categorical name from the DL typology. Fig. 1 illustrates the path of 
both trend and peripheral scenarios through the expanding and contracting conical space. Trend scenarios take a 
central path through the cone (i.e. the white space). They can use probabilities to help define the paths of logical 
connectivity between factors, and present surprise-free storylines, or rely heavily on normative factors with 
more qualitative data methods (Ducot and Lubben, 1980; Shearer, 2005; van Notten et al., 2003). Probabilities 
can be determined using a number of methods and models, including subjective measures, trend analysis, and 
extrapolation of historical data, to name a few. These scenarios can present outcomes from business-as-usual 
thinking, and by extension, include normative values (Burt, 2007). Peripheral scenarios lie towards the edges of 
the cones (i.e. the darker space) and represent extreme futures, encompassing disruptions, surprises, or difficult 
possibilities (Ducot and Lubben, 1980). Peripheral scenarios are as likely to depict utopian storylines as they are 
dystopian. The VRVR typology share these same titles, expressing similar definitions of trajectories. Compound 
scenarios present both categories, through a process of blending multiple scenarios together – possibly simpler 
ones of lower complexity – creating a richer storyline. The CIA method differs from the other scenario schools 
of practice by integrating a compounding element in the latter stages of the process. Probabilities of future 
trends and impact projections are coupled, in that the occurrence of one event is influenced (dependent) by the 
probability or impact of another identified event (Huss and Honton, 1987). Another way is to determine the 
probabilities of one trend, coupled with the conditional probabilities of subsequent trends (Gordon, 1994a). This 
can be achieved by dividing the timeline into smaller periods and calculating the estimated cumulative 
probabilities for each event's occurrence (e.g. using Monte Carlo simulations with stop-gaps between time 
periods for (re)assessment), or dividing the events along a matrix to map their conditional probabilities.  
4.3.6. Validation  
“What criteria do the scenarios meet?” The evolution of SP has shown that some form of internal validation 
efforts can help practitioners determine the level of comprehensiveness each scenario can relay to the intended 
audience. Validation can also be used to reduce a large number of raw scenarios down to a more manageable 
few. Several experts have offered their suggestions on the minimum criteria for validation (Bradfield et al., 
2005; Burt, 2007; Cairns and Wright, 2018; Chermack, 2011; Chermack et al., 2001; Durance and Godet, 2010; 
Schoemaker, 1993; van der Heijden, 1998; van der Heijden et al., 2002; Wilson, 1998). Some are more widely 
agreed up on than others. The scenario-level criteria considered necessary by the majority of the literature are 
plausibility, internal consistency, relevance, transparency, and novelty. In the case of model-level validation, 
bootstrapping, goodness of fit, intuition, and novel insight are some of the most common validation criteria in 
the literature. As with other characteristics, these categories can be addressed individually, or in combination.  
Plausibility is arguably the most important criterium discussed in the literature, and is described as a series of 
events capable of happening within the set of known laws (natural/universal/physical). Wright and Cairns 
(2011) consider plausibility an essential component of the IL method. Cairns and Wright warn, though, that 
relying on scenarios to remain only plausible can (1) limit the scope of exploratory thinking and/or (2) serve as a 
feedback loop for existing mental models. This is because plausibility relies primarily on the subjective 
capabilities and knowledge of the practitioners, and is often conflated with highly probable trends (Ramirez and 
Selin, 2014). Therefore it is important to cast a wide net with plausibility and consider both ‘normal’ and crazy 
(Schultz, 2015), trend and peripheral (Ducot and Lubben, 1980), as possessing the potential for plausibility. 
Internal consistency is related to coherence, and is defined by Kosow and Gaßner (2008, p. 39) as, “paths to the 
futures and images within a scenario must be consistent with one another, i.e. their aspects may not be mutually 
contradictory or even go so far as to exclude each other for reasons of logic and plausibility.” Meeting the 
relevance criterion means the scenario has relatable messages and insights to the future of the intended audience 
or organisation. An example of this is found in the FEMA (2018) emergency planning scenarios which focus on 
bringing together different sectors, and therefore must have relevant insights for all sectors in order to work 
successfully. Wollenberg, et al. (2000) caution that a potential danger of relying too heavily on consistency with 
outcomes may risk excluding some truly novel scenarios simply because their combinations do not carry the 
intuitively normative expectations. Transparency is not discussed as much, but an implicit part of all SP 
literature. Durance and Godet (2010) consider this criterion indispensable for both usefulness and credibility. 
Transparency allows practitioners to understand the logical underpinnings of the inter-relationships of causal 
events and outcomes, or what Bunn and Salo (1993, p. 300) coin a “defensible audit trail”. This understanding 
lends credibility to the scenarios. Credibility leads to believability of such potential and plausible futures. 
Without transparency, scenarios are little more than opaque fiction. Novelty is the final sub-category that is 
discussed in arguably all SP literature, whether explicitly or otherwise. The purpose of a SP intervention, as 
stated throughout this paper, is to challenge mental models and introduce changes. Therefore, testing for novelty 
is a ubiquitous validation to any type of scenario.  
Validation of a model will depend largely on the chosen model and the target variables. For purely extrapolative 
modelling (to produce a chain of projections), bootstrapping is performed. Confidence intervals are calculated, 
which widen as the forecast horizon increases, to account for uncertainty in the model. In many cases, the 
boundaries of a model are estimated by a sample of real-world data. The model is then adjusted and repeatedly 
compared against the data until an accepted range of variance is reached (determined either by the logic of the 
model or the desires of the practitioners), and considered a good fit for the system. One way of validating fitness 
is to perform out-of-sample validation, where different sections of the sample data are withheld with each run of 
the model, to determine errors. Once satisfied, future parameters are given, and the output is considered valid 
within a margin of error (Johnson and Sieber, 2011). In the GM case study, the model output aligned with the 
intuitions of the practitioners (Eppen et al., 1989). This increased the confidence of the product planning 
analysts, and in turn determined GM's next steps to further test with different analyses before any 
implementation took place. However, the authors state that, generally speaking, “a good model can, and often 
does, produce insights not directly related to the original question” (p. 527). The fact that they chose intuition 
alignment over surprise insights as an indicator of validation may reveal a bias within the practitioners. A good 
facilitator can help make such biases explicit to the team. Johnson and Sieber's (2011) systems model was 
validated by generating novel insights about a complex system (i.e. Mongolian Plateau) that had otherwise been 
absent from the participatory scenario sessions, while also revealing significant knowledge gaps in the 
participants. Novel insights, as a function of transformative thinking, in the practitioners is one form of 
validation in Iwaniec's et al. (2014) sustainability vision modelling. Transformative thinking is by and large one 
of the most agreed upon desired effects from an intervention, and discussed at length in the extant literature. 
Any one or combination of criteria can be used, including single or multiple scales for validation (Biggs et al., 
2007). There is a near infinite number of other criteria that can validate scenarios, and as many tools to analyse 
each dimension, which should not be shied away from (Bishop et al., 2007). Further validations will largely 
depend on the chosen method, aims, and dimensions within the scenarios. The presented two categories 
encapsulate the main sub-categories applicable across virtually all SP interventions. Of course, any discussion 
on validation should give a nod to Schultz's (2015, p. 7) sentiment that the “most important future is the future 
the greatest number of people believe the most.”  
4.3.7. Variable mixture  
“How different are the variables from one another?” The VRVR typology combines both mixture and quantity 
of variables within one dimension. Though there is a close relationship between these two dimensions, we 
believe they are distinct enough to serve as separate characteristics. The CSI typology categorises variable 
mixtures as intradisciplinary or interdisciplinary. Scenarios with intradisciplinary variables focus on a limited 
perspective that looks to answer a hyper-defined set of questions or goal. These scenarios may have short-term 
horizons and borrow more heavily from normative values. An example of intradisciplinary scenarios can be 
found from the EHRAG group (Audit Scotland, 2019). Each workshop comprised of a group of experts and 
community members who had a special interest in a particular policy, as it applied to a specific population. The 
motivation would be to explore the policy impact on the designated population, within a small region of 
Scotland, spanning no farther than the next review period (6 or 12 months). These workshops would produce 
focused scenarios. Though limited in scope, some scenarios would be highly elaborative, while others would 
comprise no more than a paragraph. Interdisciplinary scenarios sample knowledge from different, possibly 
opposing perspectives, and could include clusters that blend factors from several topics, such as when 
STIRDEEPER, PESTEL, or STEEP methods are used to facilitate shared creative thinking (Wright et al., 2009). 
The VRVR typology labels these categories homogeneous and heterogeneous mixes, respectively.  
4.3.8. Variable types  
“What are the variables?” The variables are arguably the “meat” of the scenarios. Variables are the driving 
forces, factors, dimensions and events that make up the scenarios, and therefore deserve a place in any attempt 
at fully developing a typology of SP interventions. Variables are primarily critical uncertainties or 
predetermined. Critical uncertainties are those driving forces that exist in the present and potential future 
organisation's environment, but do not have a predictable path of development (Kahn and Weiner, 1967; van der 
Heijden et al., 2002). The “Global Europe 2050” report (Commission, 2011) begins a structured approach with 
the identification of critical uncertainties that were grouped into six main dimensions: global demographic and 
societal challenges, energy and natural resources, economy and technology prospects, geopolitics and 
governance, territorial and mobility dynamics, and research, innovation, and education. van de Riet et al. (2008) 
example the development of energy prices, CO2 emission policies, entrance of low-cost carriers in the market, 
and changes in point-to-point networks as critical uncertainties for the Amsterdam Airport Schiphol transport 
infrastructure planning sessions. Predetermined variables, are those driving forces and trends that will have an 
impact, but will eventually resolve themselves in time. These are “already in the pipeline” and offer a certain 
level of predictability (van der Heijden, Bradfield et al., 2002, p. 269). For example, the US deficit will exist for 
decades, most likely generations, to come. How the US deficit will impact a specific organisation and how the 
organisation will deal with the impacts in the future is uncertain, but the deficit itself is a predetermined. A 
general word of warning from the extant literature, though, is to caution against assuming too many variables 
are predetermined. As Simpson (1992, p. 15) prophetically states, “What is first perceived to be predetermined 
often turns out to be a critical uncertainty.” It is worth noting that all SP interventions must deal with 
unspecified uncertainties that are inherent in the system (Dreborg, 2002). Also referred to as hard (Dror, 1988) 
or genuine (Eriksson, 2004) uncertainties, these are the true unknowables, the variables and behaviours that are 
not possible to anticipate or predict (van der Heijden, 1998). It is by way of these inherent blinders that the 
possibility of surprise can arise (Dreborg, 2002). More often than not, the intervention process will lead to 
identifying a hybrid of variables from all the categories, and rightly so.  
4.3.9. Deviation  
“How different are the scenarios from each other?” The title and categorical names borrow from the VRVR 
typology, but the underlying assumption of the characteristic is best expressed by Heugens and van Oosterhout 
(2001, p. 863) when they state, “The scenario method never relies on a single storyline.” This is also echoed in 
Premise 4 of Cairns and Wright's (2018a) scenario model.5 A group of scenarios’ deviation is measured in the 
range of plausible futures that are taken into account (van Notten et al., 2003). Two categorical differences lie 
within this characteristic and can be interpreted on a spectrum between low deviation (conventional) and high 
deviation (alternative). The VRVR typology describes conventional scenarios as those that present business-as-
usual thinking, and adhering to the status quo, by retreading the past to define the future. Conventional scenarios 
help to fine-tune existing or proposed strategies, which can cause a fair amount of overlap between them. For 
example, when motivations aim to build preserving scenarios, such as finding the most efficient plausible paths 
for city evacuations in the face of disaster preparedness, the resulting scenarios discuss a number of the same 
factors due to the shared predetermined variables (heavy traffic) and resources (roads and highways). 
Alternative scenarios, on the other hand, present significantly different content and/or trajectories from each 
other, and may have few to no aligning factors between them. They are often used to challenge conventional 
thinking and assumptions, and to raise awareness of potential surprises (van Notten et al., 2003). Though the DL 
typology considers these contrasting scenarios as a sub-category of peripheral scenarios, this is not necessarily 
the case, and more importantly, the topic touches upon a different characteristic altogether, and therefore is 
categorised as a level of deviation. Between the two extremes are any number of deviation mixtures. Cairns 
(2014) offers an example of compound and dynamic deviations at play. The author presents a case study using a 
Critical Scenario Method to analyse end-of-life ship disposal, resulting in four plausible scenarios. From the 
workshops, at least two scenarios are developed free of surprises or disruptions – Scenario A: Global 
Cooperation and Scenario D: Business as Usual – and one scenario that includes at least one disrupted path - 
Scenario C: Bangladesh Goes Alone. No single scenario can be considered overall ‘optimal’ or ‘worst-case’ 
since these qualities vary by focal group.  
4.3.10. Quantity  
“How many scenarios?” Throughout the intervention, a selection of scenarios will eventually emerge from the 
process. The number of scenarios that are fully developed and used to challenge mental models and inform 
future decisions will depend on a number of factors, including, but not limited to, the chosen method/school, 
goals of the organisation, purpose of the intervention, and availability of resources (time, practitioners, 
technology). Amer et al. (2013) admit that there is no precise answer to the question of how many scenarios is 
optimal. However, the more scenarios, hypotheses, and dimensions that are developed, the more the information 
will lead to an overwhelming number of possible combinations, and potentially to decision fatigue, default 
choices, or worse, decision deferral – where no decisions are made at all.  
There is a general consensus that more than one scenario should be developed. A single scenario offers highly 
limited parameters and no comparisons to other future realities with which to challenge mental models and 
alternative options. Which leads to a minimum recommendation of two scenarios. The dual creation could lead 
to good-vs-bad dichotomies (Schnaars, 1987), or best-guess vs deadliest-enemy (Mitroff and Emshoff, 1979), or 
high vs low parameters (Avnery et al., 2011). In the case of Avnery et al., the two scenarios isolated from the 
 
5 “Premise 4: A better future is not based on a single reality, but on acceptance of multiple realities.” (Cairns and Wright, 2 018a, p. 5)  
IPCC Report on Emissions Scenarios represent the upper- and lower-boundary projections for surface ozone 
emissions by 2030. By focusing on just the two most extreme scenarios, the authors are able to eliminate a lot of 
information-rich noise from their report and focus attentions on the boundaries of plausible future 
developments/degradations of crops. A traditional method is to develop three scenarios. Often two are some 
version of best-and worst-case scenarios, with a third presenting a business-as-usual, trend extrapolation 
(Schwab et al., 2003), middle ground (Wilson, 1978), or most-likely (Bezold, 2010; de Kluyver, 1980). Other 
times, three scenarios can engender no specific best/worst/other distinction, but rather develop wholly different 
storylines built around different key driving forces, to reveal equally plausible, successful, but unrelated futures. 
This is the case with Erdmann and Hilty's (2010) scenario study of the potential impacts the information and 
communication technology can have to reduce greenhouse gasses. Three scenarios were developed that each 
reflect growth, moderation, and decline in various sectors of the different futures. Practitioners of the IL school 
often develop four scenarios. The two most impactful and uncertain clusters of causally related driving forces 
are each elaborated on, and built into their own opposite or differing “limits of possibility” (van der Heijden, 
1998, p. 209). The two new opposite storylines for each of the two clusters are cross-compared in a 2 × 2 matrix 
to create four distinct scenarios. Ramírez and Wilkinson (2014) review the 3 × 3 matrix method which offers a 
volume of possibilities, from which a number of scenarios can be fleshed out. Bunn and Salo (1993) suggest 
that when testing for robustness and flexibility of a strategic plan or policy, several scenarios may be needed 
before a satisfactory analysis can be achieved. Amer et al. (2013) offer a great comparison of suggested scenario 
quantities in the literature, spanning all the major schools of practice. The authors show that the range of 
suggested scenarios that could lead to a successful SP intervention largely fall between two and six, with van der 
Heijden (1998) and Schoemaker (1993) leaving the door open for any quantity and variety greater than two.  
4.4. Section 4: Scenario impact  
The final section of the CSI typology focuses on the processes carried out as a result of the intervention, and 
aims to answer the question, “How impactful was the intervention?” This section comes from early awareness 
by Wack (1985b, p. 139) that “the interface of scenarios and decision makers is ignored or neglected.” The work 
that emerges from SP interventions should not stop when the workshops end, or when the reports are drafted. A 
necessary factor in SP is the level of impact interventions can carry with them, post workshop. Potential impact 
factors are discussed at length in scenario literature, after all what is the purpose of SP if not the potentiality for 
change? As Godet and Roubelat (1996, pp. 165-166) recommend, “the container matters little so long as one is 
intoxicated by the content-communication.” Only the VAV typology includes features of this section, along 
with discussions in a number of review papers. Bishop et al. (2007) include this final stage (acting) in their 
generic approach. This is when plans are implemented, results are communicated, agendas developed, and when 
applicable, strategic thinking is institutionalised. With the addition of this fourth section, the CSI typology 
attempts to redefine traditional perspectives by extending the “full intervention” concept from just the planning, 
scoping, and developmental stages to include the follow-through.  
4.4.1. Decision makers  
“Who is responsible?” Scenarios are developed for an audience (Amer et al., 2013). That audience will be 
responsible for initiating what Cairns, et al. (2017) refer to as articulated action, and may include the board of 
directors, advisors, members of government agencies, industry, NGOs, private organisations, and general 
audiences (Barber, 2009). There are three potential groups who could hold this responsibility. The practitioners 
from within the SP process, organisational members outwith the process, or a collaboration of representatives 
from both groups.  
Ideally, the decision makers should be the same as those chosen in the practitioners dimension, within the 
previous stages of SP intervention. Many insist this is a necessary element to the success of the intervention and 
is particularly true in the IL school (Cairns and Wright, 2018; Masini and Vasquez, 2000; van der Heijden, 
1998; van der Heijden et al., 2002; Wack, 1985a). A core assumption to the SP methodology (and by extension, 
scenario thinking) is that through the multi-step practice of thinking about and framing the future, a 
practitioner's mental models are made explicit, challenged, and then changed (Cairns and Wright, 2018; Dufva 
and Ahlqvist, 2015; Mackay and McKiernan, 2018). It is from this change that better knowledge of the future 
develops. Therefore, the cognitive effects from participating in a SP intervention are as important as the 
scenarios themselves with regard to level of impact the intervention will have on the organisation. From Klein 
and Linneman's (1981) case histories, the authors discovered that the less managers (i.e. problem owners) were 
involved with the scenario intervention, the less they understood the use of the interventions, and possibly the 
existing inadequacies of conventional forecasting techniques. Ascher's (1978) review shows that the most 
common reason for errors in forecasting were due to poor underlying assumptions. Assumptions that could have 
been challenged by participating in a full SP intervention. However, any number of interventions are attended 
almost entirely by practitioners and facilitators who carry little-to-no decision-making power, who then must 
shoulder the responsibility of reporting and interpreting the resulting scenarios to – often higher ranked – 
decision makers outwith the workshop (e.g. supervisors, CEOs, upper management, etc.). There are many 
reasons the decision makers do not/cannot attend a SP workshop: time-poor executives, geographical restraints, 
and changes in the process midstream, for example. These arrangements can bring later difficulties, given that 
the mental models of the decision makers and those of the practitioners will not be as well aligned. As van der 
Heijden (1998) discussed, SP can only lead to institutional learning when there is alignment of ideas amongst 
the ranks, and this is best achieved through full participation. A compromise to the two extreme options is a 
collaboration of representatives from both groups. This is the case when the decision makers can only 
participate in part of the intervention, as with the British Airways case study which took most of a year to carry 
out multiple interviews and workshops, attended by different practitioners (Moyer, 1996).  
4.4.2. Organisational capacity  
“How much does the organisation absorb?” SP is only as valuable as the level of adoption the organisation is 
willing to achieve, of the new knowledge and insights. “Even well-constructed, thoroughly analysed scenarios 
can be of little use and relevance, if the organisational capacity to absorb them is poor” (Volkery and Riberio, 
2009, p. 1199). Organisations have the capacity for engagement, abandonment, or selective adoption of the 
knowledge, outcomes, and policies discovered during SP.  
Fully engaged organisations are those that actively integrate the information into their business models, culture, 
politics and planning. Those with active scenario narratives embed SP in a “formal process of strategy 
development by making it the basis of the corporate planning cycle” (van der Heijden, 1998, p. 242). Full 
engagement of scenario learning is also facilitated by a system of safety nets, where organisations can afford 
potential set-backs or disruptions in the process. Examples of such safety nets can be found in GM's capacity 
planning strategies proposed from their scenario learning (Eppen et al., 1989). GM foresaw high-risk closures 
that would cost millions of dollars and involve thousands of people. Though the details of their exact strategy 
are not shared, they did discuss taking additional measures to implement pieces of capacity strategies, in 
incremental steps, to allow for unforeseen failures without damaging GM shares too extensively, and allow for 
recovery efforts.  
It is often the case, however, that SP interventions are commissioned, executed, with full reports delivered to the 
decision makers, but never progress beyond, and the knowledge is abandoned. This can be due to a number of 
reasons. One common reason is the unforeseen disruptions during the course of a SP intervention, which can 
change the dynamics of the organisation in a way that invalidates many of the assumptions the scenarios were 
based on, therefore preventing the organisation from adopting the learning and, in essence, abandoning the 
knowledge. Cairns et al (2017) experienced low capacity for adoption in their Tasmania Case due to barriers 
created by political arrangements and power relations. Another way in which SP knowledge can be adopted by 
the organisation is selectively. This may be the more common method of adoption, as well. In particular, when 
the intervention includes a heterogeneous group of practitioners from different sectors – as in the European 
Commission scenario projects – it could be the case that level of power, responsibility, and influence varies 
between the sectors as a function of their interrelationship, therefore creating an inequality in their abilities to 
adopt change.  
4.4.3. Uncertainty strategy  
“What quality of uncertainties inform strategy?” Uncertainties are closely linked to the variables and causal 
relationships identified from the process and content. The types of uncertainties inherent in the scenarios will 
inform the strategy or next steps for the organisation. The three main qualities of variable uncertainty are 
discussed at length throughout Strangert's (1974, 1977) work: dynamic, static, or quasi-static.  
Dynamic uncertainties are expected to resolve with time. This brings a level of anticipated knowability to the 
scenario. The VAV typology offers several potential strategies for dynamic uncertainty. The adaptive strategy is 
a step-wise process, where such techniques as trial-and-error, can help build successive knowledge and allow 
efforts to adapt to new conditions. Adaptive strategies include efforts to systematically shape uncertainties 
(Dreborg, 2002; van de Riet et al., 2008). Recognising the quality of uncertainty revealed through the SP 
intervention, an organisation may choose to influence uncertainties by taking steps to directly engage with key 
actors to increase knowledge that will reduce specific uncertainties. Investigating uncertainties that emerged 
from the scenarios is another way to reduce knowledge gaps, while spreading the risk allows an organisation to 
divide the risks associated with uncertainties amongst the regions that are best equipped to work with them. 
Static uncertainties do not lend themselves to being easily altered or diminished (i.e. predetermined). The VAV 
typology includes a fixed strategy, where a single path is chosen and administered. Fixed strategies are part of 
the business-as-usual profile. If, however, the organisation's motivations involved a bi-directional process that 
resulted in attempts to capture the full range of alternatives in order to help ensure that decisions resulted in the 
best outcomes across a range of events, then Dreborg's (2002) strategy of flexibility or the VAV typology's 
hedging strategies may be the best choice. A strategy of flexibility requires the organisation to pick a single 
strategy (i.e. one-shot decision) that works best for all known plausible outcomes (Eriksson, 2004). Hedging 
strategies allow organisations to insure themselves against the uncertain outcomes, create an exit plan in the 
case of disruptions, and/or diversifying their risk response. Quasi-static uncertainty is much like static, in that 
this uncertainty appears to be unalterable. However, it can be better understood through limited exploration. 
Using time as a tool, practitioners and organisations can delay their decisions to a negligible degree while they 
gather more information to resolve some of the uncertainty (Eriksson, 2004). Eriksson stresses that each 
uncertainty is situation-dependent, and the chosen strategies will be dependent as much on the quality of the 
uncertainty as it will be on the goals of the intervention and content of the scenarios. The VAV typology 
suggests signposting for these types of uncertainties. After identifying any quasi-static uncertainties, an 
organisation can determine the threshold, or trigger value, where policy makers and management reassess their 
plan and adjust for change.  
4.4.4. Implementation  
“How will the organisation proceed?” One of the most important elements of SP is its effect on the 
organisation's abilities to successfully navigate the unknown future. This CSI typological characteristic is 
directly dependent on organisational capacity. An important note about the implementation efforts from any SP 
intervention stems from our understanding of uncertainty. Burt and van der Heijden (2003, p. 1020) identify that 
the continued and constant presence of uncertainty shifts the efficacy of an intervention from the traditional 
episodic format, to an “ongoing way of thinking” where the organisation looks for a best strategy process.  
Organisations can proceed as they began, with business-as-usual policies, or by adopting transformational 
policies and practices. The decision makers are the primary individuals responsible for initiating these 
manoeuvers. Business-as-usual procedures, post-intervention, are a major issue with the field of SP. This could 
be due to the organisation not applying the learning gained from their SP intervention, or worse, the intervention 
did not effectively challenge the mental models of the practitioners. Any number of reasons could lead to what 
Wright et al. (2008) consider strategic inertia. These could include lack of engagement with scenario 
development by the decision makers, roles and purposes for action are unclear, procrastination, unstable 
institutional settings and organisational capacity, and/or a strong risk-averse attitude that stifles change (Graetz, 
Rimmer, Lawrence, and Smith, 2002; Lindgren and Bandhold, 2003; Parson et al., 2007; Volkery and Riberio, 
2009). The Tasmania Case illustrates this level of implementation, and is presented in Appendix B with a 
discussion of its SP profile. Other reasons include lack of trust in the experts and facilitators engaged in the 
scenario constructions (Volkery and Riberio, 2009). With that said, there is always the rare chance that 
practitioners successfully participated in a SP workshop, developed multiple scenarios of plausibly different 
futures, and determined that the policies in place are, in fact, the best methods with which to continue. This is 
the kind of outcome that could develop from non-Cartesian approaches where the purpose of the intervention is 
to map normative policies against what-if scenarios to determine the viability of their successes.  
Transformational changes represent a form of organizational ambidexterity (Bodwell and Chermack, 2010). 
These changes can proceed through structured, semi-structured, or unstructured methods. Organisations that 
adopt transformational changes, at any level, highlight the second domain, “Learning Theory”, of Chermack's 
(2011) Six Domains of SP Theory. Structured transformational changes indicate a well-developed plan that 
accounts for bottom-up/top-down influences, process checkpoints, and a deep understanding of the 
organisation's integrated efforts, that can lead to fundamental shifts in organizational strategy (March, 1991). 
According to Gersick (1991) the purpose of SP is to introduce changes in a structured manner (i.e. 
methodically). Semi-structured implementation is the trial-and-error method of change. As Mintzberg (1994, p. 
111) states, “We think in order to act, to be sure, but we also act in order to think.” By trying out plans, much 
like experimentalists, management can begin to recognise what works, what doesn't, and begin to build 
strategies from the incremental knowledge. Implementing small changes in non-trivial ways can afford an 
organisation the opportunity to realise the impact of their transformations without engaging in the potentially 
high-risk efforts of more ubiquitous changes. One method is illustrated by Derbyshire and Wright's (2014) 
application of Taleb's (2012) antifragile methodology. The authors show how small-scale experimentation of 
scenario insights creates an incremental approach to decision-making, and in turn, “provides decision-making 
options at each incremental point” (p. 222), thereby allowing the organisation to continue or discontinue based 
on the results. In the GM case study, the most useful suggestions from the scenario workshops were to close 
several plants and eliminate certain products. To implement such an effort, a step-wise, incremental approach 
was adopted with further analyses to help determine each step to be taken and when, along with stop-gaps for 
incremental evaluations (Eppen et al., 1989). Unstructured methods are also referred to as ad hoc methods of 
implementation. Taking on an unstructured approach can be reflective of adverse contingent circumstances, 
poor communication between the players, or unpredictable and uncontrollable exogenous changes (Ströh, 2004; 
Volkery and Riberio, 2009).  
5. Discussion  
To review, the aims of this paper are to (1) present a comprehensive typology for SP interventions that offers 
practitioners clear profiles for guidance towards fundamental changes in perceptions and organisational actions, 
(2) aid scholars in empirically exploring the necessary dimensions of SP interventions, and (3) join in the effort 
of building a stronger foundation for the field of SP – and by extension, futures and forecasting methods at 
large. The result is a four-themed typology with semi-reducible dimensions, built from the knowledge 
developed through the major schools of practice, empirical and conceptual work, case studies, and real-world 
applications, from across the globe, for the better part of a century. The CSI typology frames SP interventions 
through antecedent preparation, a process of development and content, with outcomes for organisation-level 
impact, which sets it apart from the traditional SP technique studies, and guides the facilitator along a more 
logical process, which should, in turn, improve both the utility and comprehension of SP, and increase its value 
to an organisation. Bringing it all together, “the collective influence of dialogue, conversation quality and 
engagement, learning, decision making, mental models, and leadership on organization performance and 
change... combine to create performance-based scenario planning” (Chermack, 2011, p. 54), which is the final 
domain of the Chermack's SP theory.  
As stated in the limitations section, some of the dimensions of previous typologies do not fit into the discrete 
dimensions of the CSI typology. Instead they describe a selection of dimensions that comprise a SP profile. This 
is the case with the WE typology's three themes: problem-focused, actor-centric, and RIMA. Problem-focused 
scenarios address systems of low uncertainties and issues with low stakes, where the knowable future 
environment provides objective, quantifiable factors, and scenarios develop free from value judgments – norms. 
These scenarios focus on the outcomes more than the process. Actor-centric scenarios source qualitative, 
subjective information through strategic conversations that lead to group consensus on any number of variables. 
These methods are more concerned with the depth of the conversations, changes in cultural perspectives, and 
practitioner learning than with the outcomes. These scenarios produce cross-discipline variables presented along 
a temporal chain storyline. RIMA scenarios blend quantitative methods of probability analyses with qualitative 
methods of group-based discussions. They include predetermined uncertainties – environmental variables free 
of preferential treatments – along with high levels of uncertainties, where exploratory efforts reveal a plethora of 
options, not necessarily agreed upon by all practitioners. Appendix C plots a SP profile against the WE 
typology's three themes.  
5.1. Descriptive, explanatory, and predictive  
A repeated issue amongst the extant literature is the lack of strong empirical evidence to support the general 
claims that SP effectively changes mental models, and these changes bring a higher probability that the 
organisation will be more successful. A number of studies have attempted to fill this knowledge gap (see 
Bradfield, 2008; Chermack and Nimon, 2008; Haeffner et al., 2012; Kuhn and Sniezek, 1996; Meissner and 
Wulf, 2013; Phadnis et al., 2015; Phelps et al., 2001; Schoemaker, 1993). Though their results are thought 
provoking, collectively their data are still not enough. Part of the reason is the sometimes stark differences in 
methodological approaches to the studies. Rather than leave this issue unresolved, the CSI typology hopes to 
serve as a framework (i.e. descriptive function) for empirical research. Reinventing the methodological wheel 
for every SP intervention study is not necessary when a unifying theory is provided, with tools (i.e. typologies) 
for measuring against real-world and lab-based phenomena.  
By presenting dimensions that are dependent, independent, interrelated, and mutually exclusive, the CSI 
typology can guide hypothesis development and increase a study's explanatory abilities. For example, Phadnis et 
al. (2015) investigate the effects of SP on confidence and long-range judgments. Their results reveal a bias in 
confidence by participants for preferred plans and a change in preference for flexible long-range investment 
solutions. Schoemaker's (1993) study, however, reveals that scenario development does not affect confidence as 
much as scenario content. Kuhn and Sniezek (1996), on the other hand, reveal that confidence adjusts as a 
function of scenario time horizon, direction, and number of scenarios. These seemingly conflicting results could 
potentially be more clearly explained with a better understanding of their SP profiles. One method would be to 
determine the featured organisation's epistemological position (Phadnis et al. work with in- house experts) to 
more predictably plot the progress of the experimental intervention to their logically expected conclusions. For 
example, an organisation that takes a Cartesian approach to a SP intervention will not be motivated in the same 
way toward implementing active, transformational changes compared to a non-Cartesian approach, and this, in 
return, can hypothetically engender different motivations within a study's participants (proxy-practitioners). The 
same can be used for understanding each study's time horizon. Phadnis et al. use scenarios with a long-term 
horizon (30 years), Kuhn and Sniezek use a long-term horizon divided in to medium-term sections (50 years 
divided into decades), and Schoemaker's study uses short-term horizons (1–5 years). The particular temporal 
dimensions will have a direct effect on the level and quality of uncertainty in the developed scenarios, which 
will determine the type of uncertainty strategy. As well, sourcing the sample of participants from a closely 
selected population (e.g. MBA students with Schoemaker and inhouse experts with Phadnis et al.) may generate 
a homogeneous group (depending on demographic criteria), therefore eliminating the heterogeneous profile.  
For facilitators and practitioners, the CSI typology offers a predictive functionality to their SP intervention 
efforts. In line with the empirical discussion, understanding an organisation's epistemological approach and 
motivations will determine the types of impact the intervention could lead towards. The exclusion of decision 
makers in the group of practitioners may have a higher probability of leading to an abandonment of the scenario 
lessons, resulting in an business-as-usual implementation and reinforcement of norms. If the goal of the 
intervention is to create chain scenarios that present a continuous storyline, then the facilitator(s) can ensure that 
a congruent time horizon is made explicit to the practitioners during the antecedent preparation stage, which will 
inform their variable scale, data type and collection.  
It is sometimes the case that conditions change during the execution of a SP intervention, whether it be a 
loss/change in some practitioners or a change in available institutional resources or conditions. Any changes in 
the process have the potential to alter the course of the intervention. By having developed a CSI typological 
profile, facilitators can better anticipate the outcomes of these last-minute changes, and make real-time 
alterations in the intervening SP process to counter any biasing from the disruptions and decrease the chances of 
failure in efficacy.  
Another aim of CSI is to help organisations that have limited resources. SP interventions are already resource 
intensive, so organisations with limited resources are the least likely to utilize the benefits of an intervention 
(Phelps et al., 2001). The CSI typology can help facilitators develop a process that maximises available 
resources through carefully considered techniques based on the particulars of the SP profile.  
5.2. Best-practice suggestions  
Though the SP methods are pragmatic, with any number of dimensions proving necessary/unnecessary for a 
given SP intervention, there are a few best-practice suggestions provided by the field. First, it is important to 
reiterate Ducot and Lubben's (1980) suggestion regarding the use of typologies. Aligning scenarios with the 
cross-selection of the typology's dimensions, creating a unique SP profile, will result in scenarios that are more 
resilient to methodological criticisms, and by extension, more credible. An example is given of a scenario 
planning profile in Appendix B using the Tasmania Case. Creating their profile, retroactively, allows us to 
quickly identify potential points of friction which may have led to the low efficacy of the intervention, as well as 
points of cohesion and their benefits.  
It is a standard task in all SP schools to initially identify a problem, goal, or issue at the start (Bradfield et al., 
2005). An effective SP intervention requires extensive planning and preparation. This initial point is illustrated 
well in the follow-up analyses from Moyer's (1996) “British Airways” case study. The author recognised that 
the SP team “underestimated the amount of work involved in developing plausible but challenging scenario 
stories... the team would have benefited from having a full-time analyst working on the problem... more contact 
by the team with external experts would have been useful... facilitators were doubling as presenters and vice 
versa,” and many of the commitment issues with their team “could have been overcome if the presenters had 
been included more in the planning and running of each workshop” (p. 179).  
Success is greatly increased by ensuring at least one expert facilitator is designated to the task (Bradfield, 2008). 
For large-scale SP interventions, such as with the FEMA, ESPAS projects, and British Airways case study, 
multiple facilitators with specific designations within the workshops may be necessary, in order to meet the 
needs of the tasks. The British Airways case study included five facilitators, each responsible for the workshop 
phase (Moyer, 1996). Facilitators are able to remain more vigilant than practitioners with respects to regarding 
unnecessary constraints and reducing them where possible (Duckett, et al., 2017). Even more so, creating a 
scenario planning profile that includes at least one expert facilitator, and a heterogeneous group with at least one 
external expert (e.g. remarkable person), will greatly increase the chances of avoiding standard pitfalls that stem 
from bounded rationality. This is a dimension of the second domain of Chermack's (2011) SP theory, “Decision-
Making Theory”, and a key concern with SP. Bounded rationality is the inhibition of idea generation due to an 
individual's limited knowledge (Simon, 1972). This is an unavoidable feature of being a thinking human being, 
but measures can be taken in other CSI dimensions to counter such limitations.  
A final recommendation for increasing success is ensuring the decision makers comprise at least part of the 
practitioners. Volkery and Riberio (2009, p. 1201) explain, “The main impacts of scenarios often result more 
from the process of developing them rather than from any published product describing the scenarios that were 
created.” It is in the process that such importance lies because this is when mental models are made explicit and 
challenged (Chermack, 2011). The effects of challenging mental models are what increase adoption of the 
knowledge gained from SP. Further, “it has implications for the extent to which people trust scenarios and thus 
use them” (Volkery and Riberio, 2009, p. 1202). As one practitioner reported, after participating in a series of 
SP workshops, “In painting that picture it helped build relationships, it helped build that sense of common 
purpose and understanding. I think that's very powerful” (Bowman et al., 2013).  
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Table 1. CSI typology table. 
Section Characteristic Category Sub-category 
Section 1: Epistemology Cartesian  
Project Goal  Non-cartesian 
 
 







 Value/Reality Descriptive Hypothetical 
   Plausible 
  Normative Active 
   Passive 
  Dynamic 
 
 
 Vantage Point Forward-casting Likely futures 
   What-if 
  Backcasting Ideal futures 
   Crisis focused 
  Bi-directional Hedging 
   Selective 
 
 Motivation Preserving  
  Transforming 
 
 
 Application Generic 
Specific 
 
 Subject Issue-based  
  Area-based  
  Institutional-based  
  Cross-based 
 
 






 Horizon Short-term  
  Medium-term  




 Geographic Scope Global 
Supranational 
 
  National  
  Regional  
  Local  
  Overlapping 
 
 
Section 2: Practitioners Facilitators   
Process Design  Problem owners  
  Employees   
  Experts Inhouse 
Remarkable people 
  Community  
  Stakeholders (continued on next page)  
 
  Cross-populations 
 
 
 Groups Homogeneous   
  Heterogeneous 
 
 
 Data Quantitative   
  Qualitative 
 
 
  Complimenting  
 Data Collection Participatory  
  Desk-research Dynamic modelling 
  Blended 
 
 
 Resources Extensive  
  Limited  
  Complex 
 
 
 Institutional Conditions Open  




Section 3: Temporal Nature Chain  
Scenario Content  Snapshot  
  Varied 
 
 
 Complexity Low  
  High 
 
 
 Integration Low  
  High 
 
 







 Dynamics Peripheral  
  Trend  
  Compound 
 
 





  Model-level Bootstrapping 
Goodness of fit 
Intuition 
Novel insights 
  Combination 
 
 
 Variable Mixture Intradisciplinary  
  Interdisciplinary 
 
 








(continued on next page)  
 
 Deviation Conventional   
  Alternative 
 
 
 Quantity Two  
Greater than two 
 
 
Section 4: Decision Makers Within  
Scenario Impact  Outwith  
  Collaboration 
 
 
 Organisational Capacity Engagement  
  Abandonment  
  Selective Adoption 
 
 
 Uncertainty Strategy Dynamic Adaptive  
  Static Fixed 
Flexible 
Hedging 
  Quasi-static Signposting 
 
 Implementation Business-as-usual  
  Transformational Structured 
   Semi-structured 
   Unstructured 
 
  
Fig. 1. Ducot and Lubben's (1980) exploratory (1a) and anticipatory (1b) scenario spaces.  
1a 1b 
  
Note: Trend scenarios are represented by the lighter area in the middle of the cone. Peripheral scenarios are 
represented by the darker area that spreads out to the edges of the cone.  
 































































Table 2. SP interventions used to test the CSI typology parameters. 
 
Project Summary Reference 
Tasmania Case The aim was to explore the potential role of 
unions in supporting regional regeneration 
in North West Tasmania.  
(Cairns, Wright, 
Fairbrother, & Phillips, 
2017) 
Global Trends 2030 The aim was to explore the possibility of 
establishing “an inter-institutional system 
identifying long-term trends on major 
policy issues facing the EU”. 
(de Vasconcelos, Grevi, 
Peral, & Zanders, 2012, 
p. 5) 
RAND Europe – Europe’s 
Societal Challenges 
Part of the ESPAS projects, the goals were 
to assess global trends and develop policy 
responses across EU institutions, spanning 
2014-2019. 
(Hoorens, et al., 2013) 
Arctic Council’s Arctic Marine 
Shipping Assessment 
Extensive assessments, workshops, and 
interviews to understand clearly the 
uncertainties that might shed light on the 
determinants of future Arctic marine 
operations. 
(Ellis & Brigham, 2009) 
Deepwater Horizon oil spill U.S. Department of the Interior established 
a Strategic Sciences Working Group to 
provide rapid scientific assessment of 
potential consequences of the spill that 
could provide usable knowledge to 
decision-makers. 
(Machlis & McNutt, 
2010) 
US Geological Survey 
Appalachian (Bsal) scenarios 
Scenario planning facilitated brainstorming 
sessions to produce cascading 
consequences (social, economic, and 
ecological) of a Bsal disease outbreak in 
the Appalachian region. 
(Hopkins, et al., 2018) 
Defence industry SP method of articulating migration 
landscapes to connect forecasting and 
backcasting efforts in order to realise a 
desired end-state. 
(Dortmans, 2005) 
Sweden’s future crime arena A short-run scenario workshop with a small 
team of public representatives carried out to 
understand more deeply the logic of the 
future crime arena.  
(Lindgren & Bandhold, 
2003) 
Australia’s gender pay gap Data of past and present trends are used to 
inform two scenarios of future trends in 
employment and pay gap. 
(Jefferson & Preston, 
2005) 
Migration forecasting Mixed data scenarios that provide informed 
guesses about future migration flows and 
trends to inform policy, programmes, and 
resource allocation. 
(Migration Data Portal, 
2017) 
Global-Change Scenarios Scenarios aimed at providing current 
evaluations of climate change science to 
inform public debate, policy, and 
operational decisions.  
(Parson, et al., 2007) 
 
 
(continued on next page)  
 
Next 200 Years: A Scenario for 
America and the World 
A series of highly complex, forecasting 
scenarios exploring society, culture, 
economics, industry and more for the next 
200 years. 
(Kahn, Brown, & Martel, 
1976) 
Empowering Europe's Future An extensive project to help inform 
governance, power, and options for the EU 
by 2030. 
(Grevi, Keohane, Lee, & 
Lewis, 2013) 
National Level Exercise 2018 National level scenario-based exercises 
with large heterogeneous practitioners who 
examine the ability of all levels protect 
against, respond to, and recover from a 
major Mid-Atlantic hurricane.  
(FEMA, 2018) 
NASA - Hypothetical Comet 
Impact Scenario - PDC 2019 
A hypothetical “worst case” comet impact 
scenario for a long-period comet to create 
plausible, technically realistic storylines.  
(NASA, 2019) 
Kuna Yala case study Cases study of implementing alternative 
scenario methods for cross-community 
collaborations when cultural norms 
traditionally prevent such efforts. 
(Rawluk & Godber, 
2011) 
The future of logistics: Scenarios 
for 2025 
A study of scenario techniques used to 
present futures of the logistics service 
industry to establish flexibility, creativity, 
and the ability to adapt to changes quickly. 
(von der Gracht, 2008) 
25 by 25 policy The scenario discovery model was used to 
lead practitioners through discovering the 
potential impacts of renewable energy 
requirements to produce 25% of energy 
from renewable sources by 2025. 
(Bryant & Lempert, 
2010) 
Informing water use planning with 
consumer preferences: a case 
study in Kelowna, B.C. 
Scenario intervention to promote water 
efficient residential landscaping practices 
by exploring the psychology behind 
residents’ water use decisions, and to 
improve understanding of drivers of 
residential water demand.  
(Pipher, 2014) 
The seventh technology 
foresight—future technology in 
Japan towards the year 2030 
Conducted a technology forecast survey to 
inform scenarios that projected the future 
direction of technology in Japan from a 
long-term viewpoint. 
(NISTEP Report, 2001) 
The Trend Report Conducted for ESPAS, this report presents 
findings of research on global economic 
trends up to the year 2030 and how they 
could affect Europe.  
(Gros & Alcidi, 2013) 
VERA Four scenarios aimed to provide relevant 
strategic intelligence for the future 
governance and priority-setting of the 
RTDI system in Europe.  
(Teufel, et al., 2013) 
Digital Futures Final Report Scenarios exploring the potential 
interactions between different areas of 
technology, human life and global 
resources, and the role of digital 
technologies, to the2030 – 2050 time 
horizons. 
(CNECT, 2016) 
Global Europe 2050 Scenario planning using a highly 
participatory approach combining visionary 
(Commission, 2011) 
(continued on next page)  
thinking with plausibility to combine the 
global perspective with a specific focus on 
the future of European integration.  
 
The Year 2000: A framework for 
speculation on the next thirty-
three years 
An extensive series of scenarios imagining 
what the world may be like over the next 
33 years. 
(Kahn & Weiner, 1967) 
Global Warming of 1.5°C The report provides future impacts of 
global warming of 1.5°C – above pre-
industrial levels – and greenhouse gas 
emission pathways, as contained in the 
Decision of the 21st Conference of Parties 
of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change to adopt the 
Paris Agreement. 
(de Coninck, et al., 
Strengthening and 
implementing the global 
response, 2018) 
British Airways case study Part of VRVR typology’s 18 case studies. 
“a 1994 explorative scenario analysis that 
examined societal developments and their 
implications for the airline industry.” 
(Moyer, 1996) 
(van Notten, Rotmans, 
van Asselt, & Rothman, 
2003, p. 435) 
Dutch transportation infrastructure 
policy evaluation  
Part of the development of the VAV 
typology, to determine superfluous or 
underuse of scenario analysis and adaptive 
approaches to assess policy in the 
transportation infrastructure industry. 
 (van de Riet, Aazami, & 
van Rhee, 2008) 
Equalities and Human Rights 
Advisory Group 
The Scottish Government initiative to 
crowdsource knowledge from third-sector 
organisations to improve policy 
development and implementation. 
 (Audit Scotland, 2019) 
 
 
Table 3. Novel scenario planning methods used to test the CSI typology parameters. 
 
Project Summary Reference 
Reference Scenarios The purpose of these scenarios is to 
identify past and present trends then to 
project them into the future for explorative 
understanding. 
(Ackoff, 1981) 
ALIVE A scenario-based training program based 
on collaborations with National Institute of 
Standards and Technology, Chicago Fire 
Dept, and FDNY. 
(USFA, 2018) 
Critical Scenario Method The study applies the Critical Scenario 
Method to explore different possible and 
plausible futures for the ship-breaking 
industry globally and locally. 
(Cairns, 2014) 
Case study 1: the English 
provincial broker’s future 
Scenario planning with multi-criteria 
decision analysis (SPMCDA) support was 
used to help the client ensure that their 
chosen strategic direction best suited their 




& Tumidei, 2006) 
 
(continued on next page)  
 
Case study 2: the warehouse 
development in Casemurate, Italy 
SPMCDA was used to help the client 
determine the uncertainties with planning 
permission for zoning revisions of farm 
land to warehouse development. 
MSG Experimenting with a method of generating 
a very wide range of futures to facilitate 
thinking broadly and open-mindedly about 
what may lie ahead upon which to base 
strategic planning. 
(Davis, Bankes, & 
Egner, 2007) 
GM - A scenario approach to 
capacity planning 
A scenario model was developed for GM to 
aid in making decisions about capacity for 
four of their auto lines. 






Table 4. Tasmania Case SP profile. 
 
Section Profile Explanation (Cairns & Wright, 2018) 
Section 1: Epistemology   
Project 
goal 
- Non-Cartesian The aims were to prompt articulated 




 Control   
 Conflict point “divergence of opinion about key 




 - Reactive “Our own reading of the Delphi report, 
along with the transcripts of the first 
rounds scenario workshops, indicated 
that there was considerable focus on 
decisions and events outside the region, 
with signs that the region itself was a 
mere ‘passenger’ on the journey set by 
others… Economic matters were by 
and large driven by outside factors, and 
by extra costs imposed on local 
business, such that of sea transportation 
and agricultural produce to the major 




 - Preactive “Others, however, rejected the notion… 
For these individuals, economic 
resilience needed to be built around the 
ground-up growth and nurturing of 
small businesses within the region.” 
 
(p.233) 
 - Proactive “For some, economic resilience and 
regeneration should come from seeking 
a new, large incoming industry to 
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 Value/reality   
 - Descriptive 
- Plausible 
“In both workshops, the opening 
question of participants was whether 
the scenario narratives were plausible 
and possible, which was confirmed 
without question in both cases.” 
 
(p. 232) 
 Vantage point   
 - Bi-directional 
- Selective 
“development of a set of initial extreme 
scenarios by the research team” then, 
“applying the ‘backward logic’ 
approach, participants were asked to 
discuss the scenarios… that would lead 
the future to unfold in one or the other 
set of outcomes.” 
 
(p. 232) 
 Motivation   
 - Transforming The intent was to prompt articulated 




 Application   
 - Specific “The full research programme was 
directed at exploring the potential role 
of unions in supporting regional 
regeneration in North West Tasmania.” 
 
(p. 231) 
 Subject   
 - Cross-based “exploring the potential role of unions 
in supporting regional regeneration in 
North West Tasmania” 
 
(p. 231) 
 Variable scale   
 - Multi-scale “A total of ten theme headings were 
extracted from the content analysis” of 
two scenario workshops. The themes 
encompassed external (e.g. “Global 
conflict and instability”) and internal 
(e.g. “Attitudes towards education, 
training and employment”) variables. 
 
(p. 232) 
 Horizon   
 - Short-term “What must you… do in the very near 




 Geographic scope   














“engage a dispersed and diverse group 
of organizational stakeholders… The 
first [scenario workshop] brought 
together 15 participants, representing 
unions, local government, state and 
Commonwealth government agencies, 
along with the CEOs of non-
governmental organisations (NGOs). 
The second was held as part of the 
regular, quarterly meeting of Mayors 




 Groups   
 - Heterogeneous Public, private and NGOs. “The body 
of stakeholders included the unions that 
were the focus of the programme, along 
with senior representatives of the nine 
local government areas (LGAs) from 
the region, Tasmanian state agencies, 
the local government economic 
development agency covering the nine 
LGAs, the regional university campus, 
and local business leaders.”  
 
(p. 231) 
 Data   
 - Complimenting “semi-structured interviews” and 
“Delphi inquiry was conducted… 




(pp. 231, 233) 
 Data collection   




 Resources   
 - Complex Time-poor executives, and political 
changes, but full participation of public, 
private, and NGO bodies. 
 
 
 Institutional conditions   
 - Structured A set of scenarios were presented to the 
participants for exploration, then ten 
themes were extracted and presented in 
a Delphi round for ranking. 
 
 
Section 3: Temporal nature   
Scenario 
content 
- Varied “participants were asked to discuss the 
scenarios in small groups, and to 
consider the driving forces in the 
present…that would lead the future to 




 Complexity  (continued on next page)  
 
 - ? Table 10.2 “Summary outlines of 
branching scenario narratives” does not 
offer the full scenario narratives. 
 
(p. 236) 
 Integration   




 Themes   
 - Discipline “Best scenario: Taking advantage and 
making the very best of opportunities 
provided.” 
 
“ Local Scenario A1: Government set a 
remit for the regional bodies to bring 
diverse groups and communities 
together to focus on common strategic 
objectives… Let me welcome you to 
our region where we have built our own 
future.” 
 
“Local Scenario B1: This saw the 
spawning of localized initiatives 
addressing a range of social issues. 
Gradually the economy became one 
orientated toward addressing needs 
rather than wants and alternative 
trading schemes… Let me welcome 
you to our region where we have 
safeguarded our future.” 
 
(pp. 234, 236) 
 - Collapse “Worst scenario: Failing to capitalize 
and opportunities offered…Inaction, 
decline and the culture of despair and 
learned helplessness.” 
 
“Local Scenario A2: Attempts to bring 
the region together failed as old 
rivalries, mistaken perceptions and 
short-term opportunism shaped the 
agenda… Let me welcome you to our 
region where we have wasted our 
future.” 
 
“Local Scenario B2: … set the scene 
for economic, social and infrastructure 
deterioration over the decade… Let me 
welcome you to our region where we 
have no future.” 
 
(pp. 234, 236) 
 Dynamics   
 - Peripheral “development of a set of initial extreme 
scenarios… representing in simple 
terms best- and worst-case conditions” 
 
(pp. 231, 235) 
 Validation   




(continued on next page)  
 
 Variable mixture   
 - Interdisciplinary Ten themes emerged from participants 
after using PESTEL framework 
 
 
 Variable types   
 - Hybrid? Not explicitly discussed. 
  
 
 Deviation   
 - Alternative “For each, we then built two alternative 
local narratives.” 
Table 10.2 presents four Higher-level 
Scenarios of ‘Best’ case and ‘Worst’ 
case. 
 
(pp. 235, 236) 
 Quantity   
 - Four Local Scenario A1, Local Scenario B1, 
Local Scenario A2, Local Scenario B2 
 
(pp. 234, 236) 
Section 4: Decision makers   
Scenario 
impact 
- Within “senior regional stakeholders who had 




 Organisational capacity   
 - Abandonment Even though the process was trusted 
and politically backed, “changes of 
government and actors that militate 
against continuity… and against 
coordinated action towards a better 
future” and “not actually putting the 
resources in place to achieve it.” 
 
(p. 238) 
 Uncertainty strategy   
 - Static 
- Fixed 
The SP group members speak of 
external factors beyond their control 
that will eventually resolve themselves. 
Internal factors almost beyond their 




 Implementation   
 - Business-as-
usual 
“nothing has changed” and “what 
would be the reason for us to actually 
do something different when for the 
last 20 years what we've been doing, 
we haven't really changed” 
(p. 238) 
 









WE typology themes 
Problem-focused Actor-centric RIMA 
Section 1:  
Project goal 
Epistemology Cartesian Non-Cartesian Non-Cartesian 











& Normative active 
Vantage point Forward-casting, 
inductive 
All Bi-directional 
Motivation Preserving Transforming Transforming 
Application Generic Specific All 
Subject Issue-based Institution-based Area-based 
Variable space External & Policy Internal Multi-scale 
Horizon Single time horizon Single time horizon ? 
Geographic scope All All All 
Section 2:  
Process design 
Practitioners (Objective) Experts, 
Scientists 
Stakeholders & decision 
makers 
Stakeholders & decision 
makers 
Groups Homogeneous Heterogeneous  Heterogeneous 
Data Quantitative  Qualitative Complimenting  
Data collection Desk research 
Dynamic modelling 
Participatory (primary) 






Extensive or Complex 
Institutional conditions Constrained Open or 
Structured 
Open 
Section 3:  
Scenario content 
Temporal nature Chain Varied  Varied 
Complexity ? ? High 
Integration ? ? High 
Theme ? ? ? 
Dynamics ? ? Compound 
Validation Model-level *Scenario-level 
combination 
Combination 
(continued on next page)  
 
Variable mixture Unknown but favours 
intradisciplinary 
Unknown but favours 
interdisciplinary 
Interdisciplinary  





Deviation ? Alternative Conventional & 
Alternative 
Quantity ≥ 2 scenarios ≥ 2 scenarios  >2 scenarios 
Section 4:  
Scenario impact 
Decision makers Outwith Within  Within  
Organisational capacity ? Selective Adoption Engagement 
Uncertainty strategy Static uncertainties are 
given either a flexible or 
hedging strategy 
Dynamic uncertainties 






with adaptive strategies 
Implementation ? Transformational Transformational: mostly 
semi-structured 
 
Note. Some of the CSI dimensions are not discussed in the WE typology themes. For unclear/undiscussed 
dimensions, “?” is used as a placeholder. For themes that could apply to all the categories within a single 
characteristic, “All” is entered. 
 
* The scenarios are free from quantitative modelling efforts, therefore validation is a combination of scenario-
level sub-categories, and not the more broad combination of both scenario-level and model-level validation.  
 
